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Abstract  
 
 In June 1919, President Woodrow Wilson returned from Paris after several 
months of negotiating the Treaty of Versailles to end World War One. At the peace 
conference, Wilson achieved his goal of establishing the League of Nations. However, he 
had one more hurdle: convince the Republican Senate to ratify the treaty. This was no 
easy task as Republicans claimed the treaty nullified the Monroe Doctrine, even though 
the century-old foreign policy was recognized, by name, in the League of Nations 
Covenant. Why, then, did opponents of the League of Nations in the United States claim 
isolation and refuse to ratify the treaty even though the Monroe Doctrine was included in 
the diplomatic agreement? 
 The answer lies with the Republican foreign policy of expansionism that thrust 
the United States onto the world stage as a colonial power in 1898. Evidence from letters, 
diaries, and published articles by major Republican leaders, such as Theodore Roosevelt 
and Henry Cabot Lodge, proves that the United States wished to maintain its authority 
over the Western Hemisphere and other areas controlled by the colonial power. Further, 
an examination of the interactions between Democratic and Republican leaders illustrates 
the urgency with which those opposed to the League placed on the protection of the 
Monroe Doctrine’s authority within the Western Hemisphere.  
 While one cannot disregard the political drama that unfolded during the League of 
Nations debate in 1919, it is necessary to look at a broader picture in order to understand 
why opponents wished to include the Monroe Doctrine in the treaty and pretend to be in 
isolation. The conclusion that the United States wished to remain sovereign with 
authority over the Western Hemisphere provides the notion that Americans wanted to be 
 viii 
 
on par with European imperial powers, but also provides answers as to why many in 1919 
argued that the United States was an isolationist nation, even when it clearly was not.  
1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On December 14, 1919, a flurry of activity engulfed the streets of Paris. Many 
people lined the broad avenues and looked from their balconies just to catch a glimpse of 
the man whom they believed would save 
the world from all future wars.
1
 This 
enthusiasm was not limited just to Paris. 
Neglected and subservient people all over 
the world heard this man’s message and 
wholeheartedly supported his vision for a 
new international order.
2
 The world loved him, and he loved the world. However, this son 
of a Presbyterian minister, who witnessed the carnage of the American Civil War as a 
young boy, was not loved by the entire world. In fact, he was despised by a select number 
of senators from his home country. This man was Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth 
president of the United States.  
The story about Wilson’s fight for the League of Nations against the recalcitrant 
Republican senators is all too familiar. Historians cannot get enough of this early 
twentieth century political drama that engulfed the United States. The suspense, the back-
room dealing, the name-calling, and the transition of the United States from a growing 
                                                 
1
 For two vivid descriptions of Wilson’s entry into Paris, see Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six 
Months that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001), 15 – 16; and, John Milton Cooper, Jr., 
Woodrow Wilson: A Biography (New York: Random House, 2009), 462.   
 
2
 For a discussion detailing how Woodrow Wilson’s message of self-determination sparked 
conversation and excitement throughout the world, see Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-
Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). For an account of two Polish peasants who walked to Paris accompanied by an astronomer 
and a priest to urge Wilson to include their homeland within the creation of Poland, see Diary of Dr. 
Grayson, April 11, 1919, in Arthur S. Link, ed., The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. 57 (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), 237. (The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, edited by Arthur S. Link, 
will hereafter be cited as PWW, along with volume number and page number.)  
Figure 1: Parisians Greet Wilson, [c. 14 Dec. 1918], 
Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library 
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imperial power to a country proud of its isolation grab many diplomatic historians by the 
heartstrings due to the complexity of the situation. This political power play during 
Wilson’s presidency provides an avenue for a discussion, not just of America’s position 
in the international community, but how Americans perceived their role in the world.  
Since the late 1880s, the isolationist shell surrounding the United States began to 
develop cracks. By the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the country burst 
through its confines and emerged onto the global scene as an imperial power. This new 
era in American history was marshaled in by ardent expansionists such as William 
McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge.  Later presidents, such as 
William H. Taft and Woodrow Wilson, continued to increase America’s power, strength, 
and prestige throughout the world.  
By the time the United States became actively involved in World War One, 
Americans considered their country to be a colonial power, on par with various European 
nations, such as Great Britain. It was this perception that drove Wilson to insist that the 
Senate ratify the Treaty of Versailles, believing that the United States could rise to a 
higher rank of moral leadership in the world. However, Republicans were hesitant to 
approve the Treaty. They felt that becoming a member of the League of Nations would 
cause the United States to lose its position of power and influence because other countries 
would be able to interfere in America’s affairs. On a deeper level, Republicans thought 
that the League would have the ability to take charge of events in the Western 
Hemisphere, a condition that frightened the conservatives. The foundation for this belief 
revolved around the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, which stated that the 
United States was in a position of authority over the Western Hemisphere.     
3 
 
 
To protect America’s spheres of influence and the potential ability to expand, 
Republicans demanded the Monroe Doctrine be included in the Treaty to safeguard it 
from possible questioning and interpretation by future members of the League of Nations. 
Believing to be the defenders of America’s freedom from European interference, 
Republicans heralded the Monroe Doctrine and claimed the League of Nations Covenant 
nullified America’s traditional foreign policy. In so doing, the opponents of the Treaty 
hid behind a transparent veil of isolation. It is abundantly clear, however, that the United 
States was not in isolation and those who cried it the loudest were actually the ones who 
had thrust the country onto the international stage.  
While there is no doubt that power politics played a major factor with the Senate’s 
rejection of the Treaty of Versailles, the purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the 
Republican refusal to agree to the League of Nations stemmed from their construction of 
the Monroe Doctrine, which was redefined at the turn of the century. To accomplish this, 
secondary sources will be incorporated into the analysis to show that other historians do 
not recognize the gap that currently exists in the historiography. Essentially, this thesis 
will fuse two areas of historiography, which widens the scope of history to illuminate 
what others have missed. By bridging the gap between United States imperialism at the 
turn of the twentieth century and the League of Nations debate following the Great War, I 
will demonstrate how the two are actually connected.  
Currently, American imperialism and the League of Nations debate are 
independent of each other in the historiography.
3
 Perhaps the historian to have come the 
                                                 
3
 For a discussion regarding how economics triggered American expansion, see Walter LaFeber, 
The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860 – 1898 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1963). To gain a sense of Theodore Roosevelt’s role in the expansion of the United 
States, see Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: 
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closest to connecting the two is John M. Dobson. In his book, America’s Ascent: The 
United States Becomes a Great Power, 1880 – 1914, he argues that the United States 
became an imperial power for three reasons: economic incentive, political motives, and 
the ability to tutor other nations in the American democratic tradition. Within his 
conclusion, he asserts that the United States did not approve the Treaty of Versailles 
because it sought “to retreat to the status it had held between 1880 and 1914” which 
allowed it to have “relative freedom from external responsibilities [that] had enabled it to 
predominate within its chosen spheres of interest.”4 If we abide by Dobson’s conclusion, 
then we must reject his whole argument that the United States continued to expand its 
position of power and influence during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Instead, I find it more reasonable to agree with his entire argument and contest his 
conclusion. The United States wished to remain in a position of power unconstrained by 
an international organization.  
Another historian whose work was influential to the production of this thesis is 
John Milton Cooper, Jr. His first book, The Vanity of Power, examined the emergence of 
America’s isolationist position in the immediate years preceding the entry into World 
War One. Recognizing the isolationist position the United States held since the American 
Revolution, Cooper asserts that isolationism did not become a “distinct political position” 
until America’s participation in the Great War entered the realm of possibility. As the 
first historian to focus exclusively on the emergence of the isolationist position as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1956). An illustration of the expansionist trends through Roosevelt, Taft, and 
Wilson’s presidencies can be found in Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the 
Caribbean, 1900 – 1921 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1964). 
 
4
 John M. Dobson, America’s Ascent: The United States Becomes a Great Power, 1880 – 1914 
(DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1978), 225.  
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political issue immediately prior to World War One, Cooper reduces isolation to the 
“rejection of forceful commitments beyond the hemisphere.”5 After the Great War, 
however, it seems that the meaning of isolation changed to fit the situation. In 1919, the 
opponents of the League hid behind the idea that the United States should not become 
unnecessarily involved in the affairs of a country within another hemisphere that did not 
directly affect the United States. With this definition in place, they used the Monroe 
Doctrine to deflect any intrusion into the Western Hemisphere by another power.    
Since this thesis examines the League of Nations debate, I would be remiss if I 
did not mention other historians who have analyzed this issue. A plethora of scholarship 
exists regarding how Republicans and Democrats orchestrated the defeat of the Treaty of 
Versailles by divisions in each political party, as well as actions by those in control of 
each party; namely, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican) and President Woodrow 
Wilson (Democrat). Along with John Milton Cooper Jr., prominent historians include 
Lloyd Ambrosius and Thomas Knock. With a focus on the politics behind the failure of 
the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, each author argues that Wilson, either 
through his stubbornness caused by the psychological effects of his stroke or his lofty 
ideals, contributed to the defeat of the Treaty. Additionally, historians, such as William 
C. Widenor and Herbert F. Margulies, who focus on the Republican side of the argument, 
also concur that Wilson shouldered much of the blame for the Treaty’s defeat.6  
                                                 
5
 John Milton Cooper, Jr., The Vanity of Power: American Isolationism and the First World War, 
1914 – 1917 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969), 1 – 2.  
 
6
 John Milton Cooper, Jr., Breaking the Heart of the World: Woodrow Wilson and the Fight for the 
League of Nations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Woodrow Wilson 
and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988); Thomas Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New 
World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and 
the Search for an American Foreign Policy (Berkley and Los Angles, California: University of California 
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Throughout the thesis, I combine my original research with the arguments made 
by the above historians to demonstrate their deficiency in examining this complex and 
intriguing topic. As this subject analyzes a specific time in history, it is slightly difficult 
to have a chronological discussion because there were so many historical actors working 
simultaneously. However, I have endeavored to organize the five chapters in a way that 
makes the most sense. The first chapter deals with America’s foreign policy background, 
which leads to chapter two’s discussion of the divergent views regarding America’s 
participation in an international organization. Chapter three then focuses on the 
interjection of the Monroe Doctrine at the Paris Peace Conference, while chapter four 
examines the debate over the League of Nations after the peace conference. Lastly, 
chapter five brings everything full-circle by linking the evidence together to demonstrate 
that a significant reason for the Senate’s refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles stemmed 
from the desire of Republican leaders for America to be a world power.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Press, 1980); Herbert F. Margulies, The Mild Reservationists and the League of Nations Controversy in the 
Senate (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1989). 
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The Imperialist Monroe Doctrine 
 
As a young country, Americans were well aware of their vulnerability to imperial 
European nations. From his position as president of an expanding nation, which was 
susceptible to attacks by larger armies, James Monroe issued his Doctrine, crafted by his 
secretary of state, John Quincy Adams. This bold announcement, a daring move by a 
nation less than half-a-century old, threatened retaliation in the event a European nation 
attempted to impose its colonizing powers within the Western Hemisphere.   
From this declaration, politicians and policymakers, particularly in the late 1800s, 
began to reevaluate the Monroe Doctrine and apply it for their own unique wants and 
needs. By 1900, the Doctrine had been stretched to fit virtually every situation involving 
a foreign country and the United States. With each instance, the foreign policy became 
more flexible, and its strength increased. In due time, the Monroe Doctrine became 
America’s Manifest Destiny. Through examining post-Civil War foreign policy events, it 
is clear that the Monroe Doctrine became a catch-all term used to give credence to 
America’s actions and interventions regarding matters beyond its borders.  
 Until the United States was severed in half by a tragic Civil War, the majority of 
the population resided along the east coast with small pockets of Americans scattered 
throughout the country. After the reunification of the country, and the advent of the 
Transcontinental Railroad, more Americans moved west in search of their own Manifest 
Destiny. By 1890, so many people had settled throughout the West that the census bureau 
declared that the frontier no longer existed; the country could expand no more. Or, could 
it? Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 1893 frontier thesis shocked Americans into 
believing that the closure of the frontier equaled the beginning of America’s demise. 
8 
 
 
According to Turner, democracy in America thrived when individuals were able to be 
free. The West provided this freedom as the “opportunity for [Americans] to grow to the 
full measure of his own capacity.” Therefore, the frontier’s closure served as a measuring 
point in America’s development. In order to continue the great democratic experiment, 
the United States needed to seek other lands.
7
 
 However, prior to the end of the frontier and Turner’s shocking revelation, the 
country had expanded its influence and toyed with the idea of acquiring additional land. 
This expansion, according to Walter LaFeber, was rooted in bettering America’s 
economy through international trade by finding additional markets to sell its industrial 
products. In his book, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860 
– 1898, LaFeber explains that the motivation to expand was not for traditional 
imperialistic incentives, such as power and land, but rather for commercial and industrial 
reasons. Several times throughout the late nineteenth century the United States 
experienced economic downfalls and each time businessmen and politicians sought to 
acquire markets outside of the country.
8
 While LaFeber’s argument is persuasive and has 
validity, it does not provide the entire view. Rather, it serves as a starting point for 
understanding the extension of America’s business interests and ultimately its political 
power into areas outside the country.   
                                                 
7
 Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (1921; repr., Mineloa, New York: 
Dover Publications, 2010), 268, 244.  
 
8
 Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860 – 1898 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963).  
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 President Benjamin Harrison and his first secretary of state, James Blaine, are 
credited with the entrance of the United States onto the world scene in search of markets.
9
 
To this end, Harrison stayed within the confines of the Monroe Doctrine and limited his 
quest for markets in the Western Hemisphere, although his mind wandered to Hawaii as a 
potential naval base and a source of raw materials. In fact, Harrison’s administration put 
forth a treaty annexing Hawaii into the United States. However, upon being elected back 
into the presidency, Grover Cleveland withdrew the treaty from the Senate’s 
consideration in 1893, but allowed the provisional government, installed by American 
foreign minister John Stevens, to remain.  
 Even though Cleveland ended the Senate’s formal discussion of annexing Hawaii, 
the mere conversation of annexation provided the occasion for Americans to reflect and 
debate the colonial vision of the United States.
10
 Essentially, President Harrison and his 
administration, specifically his secretaries of state, James Blaine and John W. Foster, put 
the expansionist wheels in motion. Upon re-entering office, Cleveland applied the brakes 
to those expansionist wheels by not only stopping the Hawaii annexation treaty, but also 
by quieting any discussion of colonial expansion. Instead, politicians continued to focus 
on finding export markets to alleviate the economic depression that was spreading 
throughout the country.  
 However, the non-interventionist Cleveland soon had a reason to become 
entangled in Latin America’s affairs under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine. After the 
                                                 
9
 LaFeber, The New Empire, 104; Robert Beisner, From the Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865 – 
1900, 2
nd
 ed. (Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, 1986), 97, 99; George C. Herring, From 
Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
278 – 279.  
 
10
Dobson, America’s Ascent, 54.  
10 
 
 
Brazilian Revolution, when Secretary of State Walter Gresham sent six ships to keep the 
Rio de Janeiro harbor open to American commerce, Cleveland found himself 
continuously entwined in Latin America.
11
 With each episode that followed, Cleveland 
stepped up his rhetoric and pushed the authority of the Monroe Doctrine until it almost 
recoiled in his face.   
 The key to Cleveland’s elevated rhetoric is found with Richard Olney, whom the 
president named his new secretary of state after Gresham’s death in 1895. Unlike 
Gresham who preferred to seek markets, Olney understood the politics of larger imperial 
nations and believed that to be on par with them, the United States had to act like them. 
Within his first year as secretary of state, Olney managed to incite a diplomatic squabble 
between the United States and Great Britain. In July 1895, he tested his own backbone 
and the strength of his nation when he sent a sharply worded message to the British 
government.  
 The diplomatic note was sparked by a boundary dispute between Venezuela and 
Great Britain. The issue arose when a British surveyor included the mouth of the Orinoco 
River within the borders of British Guiana, stripping Venezuela of its control of the river, 
which supplied major economic benefits to South America. Seeking to end the 
disagreement, Venezuelan officials requested that the United States arbitrate the dispute. 
Many expansionists, such as Henry Cabot Lodge, saw this as an opportunity to wield 
power against an imperial nation by arguing that the Monroe Doctrine made it 
                                                 
11
 LaFeber, The New Empire, 210 – 217.  
 
11 
 
 
effortlessly clear that Great Britain had no right to take an important waterway from 
Venezuela.
12
   
 After pressure from Congress and the public, Cleveland authorized Olney to send 
a letter to the British government acknowledging the dispute and offering arbitration of 
the South American territory. Citing the Monroe Doctrine, Olney claimed: “no European 
power or combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state of the 
right and power of self-government and of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and 
destinies.” After establishing that the Western Hemisphere was off-limits to European 
imperialism, he continued: “the safety and welfare of the United States are so concerned 
with the maintenance of the independence of every American state as against any 
European power as to justify and require the interposition of the United States whenever 
that independence is endangered.” Clearly, Olney used the Monroe Doctrine as the basis 
for American interference into the question by indicating that the matter at hand was a 
purely American question, and as such should be settled by the United States.  
However, Olney took his message a step further by proclaiming that “the United 
States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to 
which it confines its interposition.”13 With this proviso, not only did the United States 
have a right to interfere in the British-Venezuelan border controversy, it was compelled 
to do so as its reign encompassed the entire hemisphere. In one letter, Olney stretched the 
Monroe Doctrine to not just denying European intrusion past the Prime Meridian, but 
                                                 
12
 LaFeber, The New Empire, 243, 248 – 250.  
 
13
 Richard Olney to Thomas Bayard, July 10, 1895, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of 
the United States (FRUS), 1895, Vol. 1, Part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), 545 – 
563; LaFeber, The New Empire, 259 – 262; Dobson, America’s Ascent, 79 – 80.  
12 
 
 
declared that the United States had full custodial authority over the hemisphere. A brazen 
move, indeed.  
In response to what Cleveland called Olney’s “twenty-inch gun,” British Prime 
Minister Lord Salisbury fired back a scathing message. In his retort, he stated that the 
boundary dispute was not an attempt by the British government to acquire more land, but 
rather “the determination of a frontier of a British possession which belonged to the 
Throne of England long before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence.” 
Referring to the Monroe Doctrine, Lord Salisbury argued that no one can “insert into the 
code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before, and which 
has not since been accepted by the Government of any other nation.”14  
In spite of this stinging rebuke and the discrediting of the Monroe Doctrine, the 
British agreed to settle the dispute by arbitration. While it is important to note that the 
British government acquiesced in allowing the United States to settle the quarrel, the 
American position on its foreign policy is even more noteworthy. The idea held by 
expansionists at the time, such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt, was that 
the United States had complete suzerainty over Latin America. This belief in America’s 
superiority within the Western Hemisphere twisted the Monroe Doctrine into a different 
shape whereby the United States reigned supreme over issues that arose involving a 
nation on the west side of the Prime Meridian. As the nineteenth century turned into the 
twentieth, this principle drove American foreign policy.  
At a time when European powers were fighting over land in Africa and elsewhere 
in the world, expansionists in the United States shied from using the term “imperialism”, 
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 Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote, November 26, 1895, FRUS, 1895, Vol. 1, Part 1, 563 – 
567.  
13 
 
 
which they felt to be a derogatory term. Since Europeans were considered to be 
imperialists, Americans did not wish to associate themselves with that term. Plus, 
America was separate from Europe, and the Monroe Doctrine ensured that no European 
nation would interfere in the matters of the United States. However, aside from his 
attitude of not wanting to appear like a European imperialist, Roosevelt believed that “we 
must grasp the points of vantage which will enable us to have our say in deciding the 
destiny of the oceans of the East and the West.” Clearly, Roosevelt’s imperialist 
sentiment shines through with his desire for the United States to determine the future of 
areas beyond the country’s border.15 
The increase of expansionist rhetoric within the country coincided with growing 
anti-expansionist sentiments. A majority of the anti-expansionists held that America 
should not compromise its anti-imperialistic values established in the original Monroe 
Doctrine. They thought that the United States should be a moral example to the world by 
not engaging in expansionist and imperialist activities.
16
  
In spite of the protests against expansionism, the United States continued to seek 
territories. The outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898 could not have occurred 
at a better time for the imperialists. Grounded in eliminating Spanish domination over 
Cuba, the war furthered American imperialism through the acquisition of Puerto Rico in 
the Caribbean as well as the Philippines and Guam in the Pacific. Similar to the British 
conflict over Venezuela, the Monroe Doctrine provided the context for America’s 
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 Theodore Roosevelt, “The Strenuous Life,” The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, National Edition, 
Vol. 13 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 324; Warren Zimmermann, First Great Triumph: How 
Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 13.   
 
16
 Dobson, America’s Ascent, 94; Herring, From Colony to Superpower, 322.  
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entrance into the war against Spain, but ended with the United States increasing its 
imperial power and colonial possessions throughout the world.   
The paradox of the Spanish-American War illuminated for many Americans the 
idea of the United States as a colonizing power. Writing to his former professor, who had 
recently become president of Princeton University, Allen Corwin asked Dr. Woodrow 
Wilson to share his thoughts about the United States involvement in the Philippines. In 
response, Wilson wrote that while he had not yet “tackle[d] the problem … formally,” he 
had certainly thought about it. These two letters suggest that the colonies gained outside 
of the Western Hemisphere sparked curiosity among Americans as to the new role the 
country was to play in the world.
17
 
Soon after his former student’s inquiry, Wilson published an article in which he 
acknowledged the imperial nature of the country and suggested that this was only natural 
due to the closing of the frontier in 1890. However, recognizing that the Philippines was 
unlike the United States, Wilson began to flesh out his idea of self-determination, which 
would emerge later in the century. With the belief that the United States should not 
impose a government upon the Philippines, he wrote that doing so would provide “a 
purple garment for their nakedness, - for these things are not blessings, but a curse, to 
undeveloped peoples, still in the childhood of their political growth.”18 Clearly, Wilson 
acknowledged that the United States should guide the Philippines in the establishment of 
a government that suits its culture, and not thrust an unfamiliar government upon the 
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archipelago. Examining the correspondence between the student and his former 
professor, as well as Wilson’s article, provides the sense that the United States was 
undertaking a new position in the world at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
The dawning of this new era witnessed the death of President William McKinley 
and the subsequent inauguration of Theodore Roosevelt to the Oval Office. Roosevelt’s 
sudden entrance into the presidency occurred while the United States was engaged in the 
Philippine-American War, which began as a direct result of the United States takeover of 
the Philippines. Unhappy that his nation did not receive independence from the United 
States, the Philippine president, Emilio Aguinaldo, led the rebellion. This insurrection 
ended in 1901 when American forces captured Aguinaldo.
19
  
After gaining the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, and placing indirect 
control over Cuba, the United States relaxed its expansionist urge. During this time, 
America began to realize how much work was involved not only in maintaining, but also 
in controlling an imperial empire. Commenting that the Philippines had become “our heel 
of Achilles,” Roosevelt inched closer to the edge of the imperialist bandwagon.20 While 
he thought that acquiring territories made a nation great and strong, he did not foresee the 
problems associated with being an imperial power. In fact, the thought of annexing more 
land within the Western Hemisphere prompted Roosevelt to declare that he had as much 
interest to do so as “a gorged anaconda wants to swallow a porcupine wrong end to.”21 
Clearly, Roosevelt was no longer interested in expanding United States territory, but 
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certainly was not willing to relinquish any authority over its territory or spheres of 
influence.  
In 1902, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy, in recognition of the Monroe 
Doctrine, asked Roosevelt’s permission to lay siege on Venezuela after the Latin 
American country defaulted on its loans to the European creditors. Initially, the American 
president granted the countries permission. However, he retracted his authorization after 
events escalated to violence. While he believed that European creditors had the right to 
collect their debts, he also felt that “no European State is to be allowed to aggrandize 
itself on American soil.”22  From this perspective Roosevelt issued his famous corollary 
to the Monroe Doctrine after the fiasco in Venezuela.  
Within his 1904 State of the Union Address, Roosevelt alluded to the recent 
Venezuelan crisis with his statement that the United States “continue[s] steadily to insist 
on the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the Western Hemisphere.” However, 
Roosevelt made it clear that the United States was not interested in acquiring more 
territory within the Western Hemisphere. Instead, Latin American countries could count 
on the “hearty friendship” of the United States provided they “act with reasonable 
efficiency and decency in social and political matters.” In what seems to be a direct 
reference to the 1902 Venezuelan issue, Roosevelt mentioned that if a country within the 
Western Hemisphere “keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no interference 
from the United States.” In cases where a Latin American country is not stable, Roosevelt 
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declared that the “Monroe Doctrine may force the United States … to the exercise of an 
international police power.”23 
Within one paragraph, Roosevelt stretched the Monroe Doctrine into a completely 
new shape, hardly recognizable from its original version. By convoluting its earliest 
meaning, Roosevelt redefined the Monroe Doctrine and through his redefinition, he 
strengthened the impact and power the United States had over the Western Hemisphere. 
Whereas Olney’s diplomatic note stated that the Monroe Doctrine provided the United 
States authority to oversee and arbitrate disputes within the Western Hemisphere, 
Roosevelt’s pronouncement allowed the United States to intervene within the internal 
affairs of a Latin American country. No longer was the Doctrine simply about preventing 
European colonization in the Americas, but now it gave the United States authority and 
supremacy over nations within its hemisphere.  
Roosevelt’s successors continued to build upon his imperialistic corollary with 
Taft’s Dollar Diplomacy and Wilson’s use of force to spread constitutional democracy. In 
1901, William Howard Taft was appointed to be the Governor-General of the Philippines. 
In this position, Taft was to oversee the creation of a government there. His background 
as a lawyer and a judge on the United States Circuit Court of Appeals aided him in this 
capacity. Later, in 1904, President Roosevelt appointed Taft to be his secretary of war, a 
position he served until he was elected president. During this time, he also became the 
Provisional Governor of Cuba after a political crisis triggered the enforcement of the Platt 
Amendment and the United States stepped in to settle the chaos resulting from a rigged 
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election.
24
 Naturally, his background as a diplomat served him well as president from 
1909 to 1913.  
Having been in noteworthy diplomatic positions, Taft understood the financial 
problems of Caribbean nations and countries throughout Latin America. Following in his 
predecessor’s footsteps, Taft enacted a policy which had its roots in the Roosevelt 
Corollary. However, rather than intervening after a political or financial crisis in Latin 
America, Taft believed it would be in everyone’s best interest to place Latin American 
countries in a favorable economic position to prevent European creditors from seeking 
payments. In fact, Taft’s proposition would keep countries south of the United States 
from seeking assistance from Europe through American loans and the establishment of 
customs receiverships. This policy became known as Dollar Diplomacy because the 
United States would use money, instead of weapons to develop stable countries 
throughout Latin America.
25
  
A by-product of Dollar Diplomacy was the increase of America’s political 
influence throughout Latin America. Now that the Roosevelt Corollary stipulated that the 
United States could and would intervene within Latin American countries during a 
financial or political crisis, the introduction of Dollar Diplomacy went a step further by 
attempting to prevent a financial or political upheaval within the Western Hemisphere. 
This policy, however, did not work as well as it was intended. In practically all situations 
                                                 
24
 Dobson, America’s Ascent, 167; Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, 125 – 134. The 
Platt Amendment was signed after Cuba gained its independence. It allowed the United States to supervise 
Cuban affairs.  
 
25
 Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy, 160 – 163.  
19 
 
 
where Dollar Diplomacy was used, Latin American republics continued to experience 
civil war, financial crisis, and political chaos.
26
  
Recognizing the unproductiveness of Dollar Diplomacy, the incoming president, 
Woodrow Wilson, declined to renew Taft’s foreign policy in favor of implementing his 
own. Formerly a political science professor who believed in the concept of self-
determination, Wilson was headstrong in establishing constitutional governments in 
unstable countries with the hope that those countries would prosper. However, Wilson’s 
decisions almost had a reactionary affect on his foreign policy, as he continued to station 
troops in the Caribbean and Latin America.  
Three weeks after Wilson’s inauguration, Mexico witnessed a coup d’état led by 
General Victoriano Huerta, who overthrew the president, Francisco Madero. Believing 
Huerta’s revolution did not represent the interests of Mexico, President Wilson refused to 
recognize the Huerta regime as the legitimate government. In January 1914, Wilson 
threw his support behind the Constitutionalist Party, led by Venustiano Carranza, which 
caused Huerta to declare himself dictator. Due to the turbulent situation, Wilson 
eventually sent Marines to Mexico with the order to take Vera Cruz and prevent the 
Huerta forces from gaining access to weapons en route from Europe. After the deaths of 
17 Americans from the exchange of gunfire with the revolutionaries, Wilson ordered that 
military action would go no further, resulting in the withdrawal of Marines from Vera 
Cruz.
27
  
The next military intervention ordered by Wilson occurred in Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic in 1915 and 1916, respectively. Both Haiti and the Dominican 
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Republic were experiencing internal political problems due to fraudulent elections. After 
each state proved incapable of adhering to Wilson’s request to have democratic elections, 
both the Dominican Republic and Haiti were placed under provisional military 
governments. Troops remained stationed in the Dominican Republic until 1924 and in 
Haiti until 1934.
28
  
Reflecting upon the Mexican Crisis, Wilson referenced President Monroe in 
assuring that “the independence and prosperity of the states of Central and South 
America is not altered.”29 It is apparent that Wilson authorized American intervention in 
Latin America under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine, not to protect the states from 
European expansion, but to promote stability and order. Wilson’s actions, however, were 
not based on Monroe’s original foreign policy, but rather on the redefined Doctrine 
issued by President Theodore Roosevelt.  
After reviewing Taft’s and Wilson’s Latin American policies, it is apparent that 
President Roosevelt set the stage for the first quarter of the twentieth century as United 
States forces occupied Latin American countries until the mid-1930s. Each president, 
however, had his own strategy for implementing the Roosevelt Corollary. Whereas Taft 
was interested in building up the Caribbean and Central America’s economy through 
loans and American financial oversight, Wilson wished to forcibly implement 
constitutional democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere. Regardless, the United 
States continued to grow in its dominance over smaller states west of the Prime Meridian. 
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This increase in authority was cloaked in the fear of European intrusion in the Americas, 
but the intended result was to strengthen the power and authority of the United States in 
the Western Hemisphere.  
American’s innate desire to expand has been present practically since American 
colonists disobeyed the Proclamation of 1763 and moved westward in search of new 
lands. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States reached the Pacific 
Ocean with California’s application for statehood in 1850. Within the next fifty years, the 
country experienced tragedy and loss, the closing of the frontier, and the extension of 
America’s Manifest Destiny. American leaders continued to seek other lands and expand, 
not just geographically, but politically, through America’s influence to different parts of 
the hemisphere, and the world.  
This destiny was shaped by those in positions of power and influence. At the 
dawn of the twentieth century, these decisions continued to be made in order to carry on 
with the transformation of the United States into an imperial, expansionist nation. While 
events that led to these decisions may have been happenstance, the decisions made in 
light of the situations are a reflection upon the notion of Manifest Destiny, made possible 
through the continual redefining of the Monroe Doctrine.  
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League to Enforce Peace: A Forum 
 
For many historians, the story about the League of Nations debate normally 
begins when Wilson embarked on his famous trans-Atlantic journey to establish world 
peace for all nations. His idealistic notions, as well as his vigor and determination, draw 
many historians to study Wilson and his quarrel with Europeans and Republican Senators 
in doing what he believed to be moral and just. Wilson’s presidency and his tenure as a 
global leader not only provide historians with groundbreaking historical events to study, 
but also perhaps one of the greatest political dramas of all time. With Wilson safely in 
Paris, many Republican Senators ignited a fight against the League of Nations as an 
attempt to disavow its credibility and to ensure its demise on the Senate floor. However, 
the spark that ignited that fight had been smoldering for years before Wilson went to 
Paris, and even before the United States joined the war in 1917.  
 Prior to entry into World War One, several peace organizations popped up 
throughout the United States. The largest and most influential of those became the 
League to Enforce Peace. While the League to Enforce Peace did not represent official 
governmental policy, it provided the framework for a lively and vibrant discussion 
regarding America’s role in the international community, which this chapter addresses. 
Evidence suggests that the League to Enforce Peace helped to directly, as well as 
indirectly, coordinate and develop the factions that engulfed the later League of Nations 
debate and prompted Americans to think critically about America’s position within the 
world. To illustrate the differing opinions, this chapter will feature five prominent 
individuals’ ideas and beliefs during that time period.  
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 Theodore Roosevelt became the first prominent individual to speak publicly about 
a world organization to maintain peace during his Nobel Peace Prize address in 1910. 
Supporting Roosevelt’s idea of a peace league was his good friend, Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge. However, their support for a league quickly dwindled when another former 
president, William H. Taft, joined the league bandwagon by becoming president of the 
League to Enforce Peace. Unlike Roosevelt and Lodge, Taft’s support of a league never 
decreased as he threw his weight behind Wilson’s League of Nations. However, during 
all of this, one person never wavered from his opposition to a league: William Jennings 
Bryan, who served as secretary of state under Wilson’s administration.  
Each of these individuals developed his own idea of peace and what the 
international role of the United States should be at the end of the war. Each man also had 
his own idea regarding whether America should become involved in the war and for what 
reasons. Curiously enough, out of these five people, three were Republicans, who at some 
point in time supported a league. The other two were Democrats: Wilson who 
passionately advocated for a league, and Bryan who opposed the idea. From this small 
cluster of prominent and influential Americans, divisions ruptured not just between 
political parties, but also within parties, making the discussion regarding America’s role 
in international affairs even more passionate. This rift within the parties illustrates that 
the debate surrounding a league was not strictly a partisan issue, although by November 
1919 the majority of Republicans seemed to coalesce around their leaders and the same 
held true for Democrats.   
 Prior to the emergence of the twentieth century, the United States engaged in only 
a handful of major wars with other countries, such as Great Britain in the War of 1812, 
24 
 
 
Mexico in the Mexican-American War of 1846 – 1848, and Spain in the Spanish-
American War of 1898. During this time, Americans appeared to value peace, which is 
apparent from the number of peace organizations that sprouted throughout the country. In 
1815, both the New York Peace Society and the Massachusetts Peace Society were 
established, and in 1828, the American Peace Society was founded. By 1850, at least fifty 
peace organizations had taken root in the country. However, each peace group had its 
own agenda and interests which prevented them from joining together and becoming one 
large organization.
30
  
 After the world erupted in war in 1914, various members of the New York Peace 
Society began forming the League to Enforce Peace with the first meeting held at the 
New York Century Club on January 25, 1915. After the initial meeting, interest grew in 
establishing a league for peace. Support began pouring in from prominent individuals 
such as former president William H. Taft and Harvard president Abbot L. Lowell. 
Eventually, the group gained enough support to officially establish itself as the League to 
Enforce Peace at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on June 17, 1915. At this convention, 
members elected Taft to serve as the president of the organization and Lowell as 
chairman of the executive committee. There, it also adopted its four-plank platform, 
known as the Warrant from History: 1) establishment of a judicial tribunal for questions 
between signatories; 2) establishment of a Council of Conciliation for all other questions; 
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3) use of force against any member that engages in hostility with another member; and 4) 
periodic conferences to discuss issues related to international law.
31
  
 Once established, the League to Enforce Peace grew to become the most 
prominent peace society in the United States. Lowell successfully gained financial 
backing from the World Peace Foundation with an annual contribution of $10,000, which 
certainly helped jumpstart the organization. Then, within 1916 alone, the League to 
Enforce Peace received $240,000 worth in pledges.
32
 Financially speaking, the newfound 
peace league was doing quite well. Also, by 1916, membership in the League to Enforce 
Peace had steadily increased with branches in all states, except Minnesota, Nebraska, and 
Nevada, with the strongest branches being in the East, particularly in New England with 
Massachusetts being the model branch.
33
 
 As time continued, the League to Enforce Peace engaged in more outreach 
programs to spread the word of its purpose and vision. With branches throughout the 
country, the organization sent leaders to speak in various towns and at numerous events, 
encouraging mayors and members of the clergy to have League to Enforce Peace Days in 
their towns and churches to promote the organization through speeches and to encourage 
membership. As the United States inched closer to joining the war, the League developed 
a preparedness campaign and during 1917, the League to Enforce Peace circulated over 
two million pieces of material to support its cause. On any given day, the main office of 
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the League to Enforce Peace could send out approximately 2,000 letters, which required 
it to have a rather large staff.
 34
 The reach and scope of the League had grown 
tremendously.  
 Even though the League to Enforce Peace began with some prominent 
individuals, the opening of chapters and branches throughout the country made it seem 
more of a bottom-up approach to peace with influential leaders at the top. However, to 
make the League more appealing and to draw the support of lawmakers, Taft knew he 
needed to enlist the help of three prominent Republicans – Theodore Roosevelt, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, and Elihu Root. Each man brought to the table different viewpoints, 
experiences, and credibility. Roosevelt, as an ex-president was extremely popular among 
American citizens and Lodge, as a senior member on the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, held some sway in Congress, as did Senator Root, who once served as 
secretary of war and state and was thus very knowledgeable in foreign affairs.
 35
  
 Neither Roosevelt, Lodge, nor Root officially endorsed the League, but both 
Roosevelt and Lodge at one time supported the idea of a league; however, their 
enthusiasm for the League to Enforce Peace never reached the point Taft had hoped. 
Nevertheless, the League carried on and became extremely influential throughout the rest 
of the war and during the Paris Peace Conference. By June 1919, the League grew to 
astronomical proportions with 300,000 official members, 115 employees in the League’s 
main office, 50,000 volunteers, and 36,333 available speakers throughout the country.
36
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 In spite of never formally endorsing or speaking for the League to Enforce Peace, 
Theodore Roosevelt seems to be the first Republican to advocate for a league. In 1910, 
Roosevelt visited Norway to accept his Nobel Peace Prize that he won four years earlier 
for his part in the negotiations that ended the Russo-Japanese War. Within his acceptance 
speech, Roosevelt’s message revolved around the maintenance of peace throughout the 
world.
37
 This award smacks with irony as Roosevelt advocated for Big Stick Diplomacy 
and the threat of force in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. 
 It is clear from Roosevelt’s speech that his views on peace were certainly not 
pacifist or idealistic. Rather, his vision of a new and improved international system was 
rooted in traditional diplomacy with hints of progressive features. In the beginning of his 
remarks, Roosevelt offered his general ideas on peace – that it should be righteous and 
not the result of a cowardly act. In fact, Roosevelt stated: “No man is worth calling a man 
who will not fight…,” thus providing the idea that Roosevelt believed that war may be 
necessary to protect a nation’s honor. Roosevelt went on to describe four avenues for 
achieving and maintaining peace. He advocated for arbitration treaties among “all really 
civilized communities”, the establishment of a world court modeled after the United 
States Supreme Court, reduction of armaments, and the “master stroke” would be if 
nations would establish a “League of Peace, not only to keep the peace among 
themselves, but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others.”  
 Even though Roosevelt suggested the reduction of “naval armaments, by 
international agreements”, he seemed to put great stock in the use of force to protect the 
peace of the nations. He further went on to state that until some “international police 
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power” could prevent violence between nations, countries should be “well prepared to 
defend” their territory.38 Roosevelt’s statements about the use of force in the name of 
peace illustrate that he certainly was not a pacifist. 
 At the outset of World War One, Roosevelt agreed with the neutrality policy put 
forth by President Wilson. In September 1914, Roosevelt stated: “It is certainly eminently 
desirable that we should remain entirely neutral and nothing but urgent need would 
warrant breaking our neutrality and taking sides one way or the other.”39 However, after 
realizing that the German invasion of Belgium violated the Hague treaties, Roosevelt 
shifted his support away from neutrality to joining the Allied cause. Furthermore, 
Roosevelt became enraged when he learned how the current administration handled the 
Lusitania incident, referring to Wilson’s diplomatic note as being of “a man whose wife’s 
face is slapped by another man, who thinks it over and writes a note telling the other man 
he must not do it.” Under the circumstances, Roosevelt believed that the honor and 
integrity of the United States had been violated and that the country should put 
righteousness above peace and retaliate.  
In 1915, Roosevelt changed his views on a league, partly due to his rift with Taft 
in the 1912 election and also to his belief that the League to Enforce Peace seemed too 
utopian as he referred to it as “childish make-believe.” In Roosevelt’s words, “Peace is a 
goddess only when she comes with a sword girt on thigh.” Clearly, he believed that in 
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order for the League to work, the United States would have to increase its military power 
and provide sufficient force behind the League to Enforce Peace.
40
 
 After denouncing the League to Enforce Peace and realizing that it was not the 
official government policy, Roosevelt seemed to remain quiet in regards to the League; 
rather, he aimed his remarks toward Wilson. It also appears that Roosevelt was afraid to 
criticize the president publicly since he requested to lead a military division should the 
United States join the war in Europe. If given the chance, Roosevelt claimed he would 
serve Wilson “with a single-minded loyalty” as a military officer. However, Roosevelt 
did not have an issue with criticizing the president privately, as can be shown through his 
many letters to Henry Cabot Lodge.  
One point, in particular, that Roosevelt found fault with Wilson was the 
president’s lack of action toward preparing the country for the potential of war. 
Compared to pacifists like William Jennings Bryan, Roosevelt considered Wilson to be 
the “real danger” with his “sham preparedness.” Roosevelt observed the changing style of 
warfare and weaponry and knew that sending a soldier to the battlefield without proper 
preparations would end in disaster.
 41
 In regards to war and peace, it appears that 
Roosevelt preferred peace, except when a nation’s honor had been challenged.  
 An examination of Roosevelt’s views toward the League to Enforce Peace sheds 
light on the notions of another individual: Henry Cabot Lodge. The relationship between 
Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge seemed to be one of immense friendship. 
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Each one would often end his letter by wishing the other man’s wife well and closing 
with an endearment such as “Ever Yours” or “Always Yours.” This tight-knit relationship 
helps us to understand why both men adopted similar views around the same time frame 
on preparedness and the international role of the United States after the war. However, 
Lodge became very vocal regarding a league, at first supporting it and then drawing away 
his support once Wilson was reelected in 1916.  
 Due to his influence in Congress, Lodge was one of the men Taft knew he needed 
to get on board the League to Enforce Peace bandwagon. In 
fact, at the one-year anniversary of the inception of the League 
to Enforce Peace, Taft invited Lodge, along with Wilson, to 
speak at a banquet. At the banquet, Lodge spoke very highly of 
the League to Enforce Peace and of the need for “adequate 
national defense.” He also stated that in order to maintain 
peace, the United States needed to do more than to send 
“punitive expeditions”, perhaps alluding to Wilson’s decision to send Marines to Vera 
Cruz.
42
 
 Lodge’s speech at the League to Enforce Peace dinner was not the first time he 
advocated for a league. He did so a year earlier in his commencement address at Union 
College. In this speech, Lodge advocated for the use of force in maintaining peace 
because “it cannot be done by words.” He further went on to advocate for a union of 
nations “to preserve peace and order.” Lodge’s friend, Roosevelt, applauded his speech, 
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referring to it as “a capital speech,” illustrating his concurrent opinion in using force to 
maintain peace.
 43
  
 Agreeing with Roosevelt’s view on preparedness, Lodge believed the League to 
Enforce Peace would assist with motivating the American public to accept preparedness, 
a topic that the League took up with enthusiasm. Lodge hoped that with the League 
advocating for preparedness, the country would inevitably become embroiled in the war 
and join the Allied side. Once the United States entered the war, the League to Enforce 
Peace changed from their preparedness campaign to the “Win the War for Permanent 
Peace” slogan. The League made itself perfectly clear that it was not a pacifist 
organization by deleting the word “peace” from several pamphlets and printing “Enforce” 
in red on its letterheads.
44
 
 Lodge believed that since the League was for preparedness and ultimately for an 
Allied victory, it would clash with Wilson’s famous “peace without victory” notion and 
thus Wilson would be anti-League to Enforce Peace. With the League spread throughout 
the country, and membership numbering over 300,000, the League to Enforce Peace 
could indirectly assist with providing an opposing faction toward Wilson’s neutrality 
policies. A problem arose, however, when Wilson and the Republican candidate Charles 
E. Hughes maintained similar views on a league, resulting in the League not becoming a 
huge issue in the 1916 election.
45
   
                                                 
43
 “World Peace Only by Force,” Philadelphia Inquirer, June 10, 1915, 13; Theodore Roosevelt to 
Henry Cabot Lodge, August 4, 1915, Selections from the Correspondence , 460.   
 
44
 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, 230; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 87, 94 – 95; Marchand, 
American Peace Movement, 157 – 158.  
 
45
 Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge, 227, 242; Bartlett, League to Enforce Peace, 81. 
    
32 
 
 
 By July 1917, Lodge no longer supported a league. This came in part due to 
Wilson’s reelection, and his newfound belief that the League to Enforce Peace would 
bind the United States “to all kinds of things.” However, Lodge continued to favor the 
use of force in maintaining peace and believed that nations should be prepared at all 
times for military engagement. He thought that preparedness would protect nations from 
outside aggression.
46
 Essentially, for Lodge and Roosevelt, the simple threat of force 
served as a barrier to belligerent nations. However, for this threat of force to be real, a 
country must have an adequate military to defend itself.  
 After the U.S. entry into World War One, Lodge remained a steadfast critic of 
Wilson’s peace plan, while being supportive of his war decisions. Here it is evident that 
Lodge viewed the terms of peace differently than Wilson. Lodge wished for the total 
annihilation of Germany to the point that it could not resurface and inflict more damages 
upon the world, whereas Wilson believed that a league could restrict any possible future 
hostile action by Germany. Lodge, however, disagreed with the president on that point. In 
fact, he did not believe a league could even be established without compromising some of 
America’s cherished values and doctrines, such as the Monroe Doctrine. For this reason, 
Lodge launched an all-out attack on Wilson’s league ideas to prevent them from 
becoming established in international law.
47
   
 Unlike Roosevelt or Lodge, former Republican president William Howard Taft, 
who once called Theodore Roosevelt a friend, did not waver in his support of a league. 
As an ex-president, Taft became a major spokesperson for the League and believed that 
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his position as president of the League to Enforce Peace provided him the ability to 
influence the beginnings of a peaceful post-war society. He believed he would be 
successful if a league resulted from World War One, even if that league did not resemble 
the League to Enforce Peace.
48
  
 Taft preferred to be bi-partisan, regardless of the politics involved. For him, the 
creation of a league became his focal point. Like his predecessor, Taft believed that a 
league without any force would be pointless as it might require a strong military to 
enforce its decisions. He also realized that a league could not prevent all future wars, but 
a forceful league could prevent some wars from beginning.
49
 
 Throughout the life of the League to Enforce Peace, Taft continuously advocated 
for and defended the notion of a league by entering into debates with others and giving 
speeches in support of a league. Taft liked to use the analogy of the need for law 
enforcement in communities to help make the point that a league with force was 
necessary to the maintenance of peace throughout the world. In a written debate with 
William Jennings Bryan, Taft wrote: “If we need fear of restraint to keep men in paths of 
peace and law, why not nations? Nations are only men united in communities.” He 
further stated that force is not always bad, particularly when used for good reasons, such 
as maintaining peace.
50
 
 Taft was also called upon to respond to a host of charges, such that a league could 
impose upon the domestic issues of a country, would nullify the Monroe Doctrine, and 
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would pull the United States into all conflicts. Taft responded to all of these charges 
negatively, claiming that a league would not interfere with the domestic issues of a 
country, that the Monroe Doctrine’s authority would remain unabated, and that Congress 
still retained the ability to declare war.  
 In his written debate with Bryan, Taft noted that the Monroe Doctrine was an 
American policy and as such would not fall under the jurisdiction of international law, 
which would keep it from being brought up at the league’s world court. If a country 
questioned the Monroe Doctrine, it would come before the Council of Conciliation, 
whose decision the United States would not be obligated to accept, unlike the judicial 
tribunal. Additionally, Taft argued that the league would not allow countries to colonize 
areas of the world, which is what the Monroe Doctrine states. Therefore, the League 
would provide all countries protection of the Monroe Doctrine.
 51
   
 Regarding the assumption that the league could overstep Congress’ authority and 
force the United States to go to war, Taft contended that the Constitution was still the 
supreme law of the land in the United States. Under a league, Taft believed that Congress 
still had the “duty to determine whether the event had arisen, imposing on the United 
States the task of furnishing its quota of an international police force and taking part in a 
campaign.” To further embellish this notion, Taft provided the example of the United 
States’ obligation to protect Panama. According to Taft, this treaty required the United 
States to intervene militarily without the expressed approval of Congress in the event that 
Panama was attacked.
 52
 This example provided Taft the evidence he needed to illustrate 
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that the United States had already subjected itself to using force to protect another nation. 
However, it could possibly be contended that this obligation fell under the auspices of the 
Roosevelt Corollary.  
 Even though Taft believed wholeheartedly in a league with force, he was willing 
to make concessions to see that an actual league was formed. However, Wilson’s idea of 
a league was bound by word only and not by force. Nonetheless, Taft supported Wilson’s 
idea of a league in the hopes that it might actually be formed with the United States as a 
member. In fact, while Wilson was in Paris, Taft sent him messages offering him support 
and advice as to how the treaty should be worded so that it would be well-received when 
Wilson returned to America.
53
  
 As a child who grew up in the American South during the Civil War, Wilson 
knew the dangers and consequences of war. Thus, when World War One broke out in 
Europe, Wilson was loath to enter the conflict, preferring to watch the unsightly event 
unfold from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. However, after events, such as the 
sinking of the Lusitania and the Zimmermann Telegram, Wilson reluctantly entered the 
country into the war. Prior to doing so, Wilson spent time discussing the issue of 
preparedness with the American people and making plans for a post-war peace society.  
 In his State of the Union Address in December 1915, Wilson stated that 
preparations for war were “absolutely imperative now. We cannot do less.”54 In this 
statement, Wilson did not declare war, but rather let Americans know that under the 
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present circumstances the only right thing to do was to prepare for the possibility of war. 
Approximately a month and half later, Wilson embarked on a tour of the United States to 
discuss the preparedness issue with the American public.  
 In a speech in New York, Wilson stated: “the question of preparation for national 
defense,” was not “a question of war or of peace.” According to Wilson, peace was 
always preferable to war, and while preparations for war did not mean a declaration of 
war, doing so ensured the ability to fight if the honor and integrity of the country came 
under fire. The only reason why the United States would enter into a war would be to 
fight for the “integrity of its own convictions,” not to acquire territory or for material 
gain.
55
 Even though Wilson put a lot of emphasis on peace, he also warned against 
pacifism in another speech while in Des Moines. There, he stated that the pacifists “are 
making one fundamental mistake” because the United States was no longer in isolation, 
and “The dangers to our peace do not come any longer from within our own boundaries.” 
In essence, Wilson acknowledged the benefits of peace, but also understood the realities 
of the world and the possibility of war.  
 Also, in his speech in Des Moines, Wilson alluded to the creation of an 
“international tribunal” at the end of the war to secure peace for the world. 56 Later in 
May 1916, Wilson met with anti-preparedness leaders and also addressed the issue of a 
world organization with the purpose of keeping the peace. In this conversation, Wilson 
used the word “force” when he referred to maintaining peace throughout the world. 
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Assuming that the United States would enter into a “family of nations” organized to 
prevent future wars, all of the nations involved would expect the U.S. to provide “her 
element of force to the general understanding.” Additionally, according to Wilson, if a 
nation stated, “we shall not have any war, [then] you have got to have the force to make 
that ‘shall’ bite.”57 It appears from this occasion that Wilson was in agreement with the 
Roosevelt, Taft, and Lodge coalition regarding the use of force to compel nations to 
maintain peace. 
 The question, however, is whether Wilson meant the use of military force? It 
appears he did, but his definition of force from a speech in New York on January 27, 
1916 to the Clerical Conference of the New York Federation of Churches implies 
otherwise. In his address, Wilson stated that “the greatest force in the world, is 
character.” Nations that earnestly believed in peace would not resort to war. If they did, 
they would abandon their principles and their self-respect.
58
 It seems that Wilson 
believed that the greatest force was morality, not the military, and that peace loving 
nations would not walk away from their values. 
 Upon hearing of Wilson’s speeches and his suggestion of a world organization to 
maintain peace, Taft invited Wilson, along with Henry Cabot Lodge, to speak at the 
League to Enforce Peace banquet in Washington, D.C. on May 27, 1916. Wilson made it 
clear within his speech that he did not attend the banquet to endorse the League to 
                                                 
57
 “A Colloquy with a Group of Antipreparedness Leaders,” May 8, 1916, in Link, PWW, Vol. 36, 
645.  
 
58
 Woodrow Wilson, “Remarks to the Clerical Conference of the New York Federation of 
Churches,” January 27, 1916, in Link, PWW, Vol. 36, 5 – 6.  
 
38 
 
 
Enforce Peace, but merely to “avow a creed.”59 As president of the United States, Wilson 
had to be careful about the words he used because he needed to remain vague on the issue 
of a league until the time that the issue could be discussed officially.
60
   
 Unlike Roosevelt, Lodge, Taft, and Wilson, the pacifist William Jennings Bryan 
disliked the notion of a League to Enforce Peace from its inception. He believed that the 
organization did nothing to advance peace, but rather helped to promote preparedness due 
to its support of force in the maintenance of peace. Bryan even referred to the League to 
Enforce Peace as “peace by terrorism.” In fact, Bryan disliked anything that had to do 
with war so much that he resigned from his position as Wilson’s secretary of state 
following Wilson’s terse diplomatic note to the German government after the Lusitania 
sunk.
61
  
 Throughout his written debate with William H. Taft, Bryan argued against a 
league, particularly one with force because he believed that it violated our isolationist 
foreign policy, required the surrender of the Monroe Doctrine, took away Congress’ 
authority to declare war, and replaced respect with fear. According to Bryan, the use of 
force for any reason precipitated a declaration of war. In response to Taft’s assertion that 
the United States was no longer isolated, Bryan argued that the country’s relations with 
Europe provided more reason to protect the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and secure 
the Western Hemisphere.
62
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Rather than acquiesce on any of Taft’s points, Bryan offered his own suggestions 
for securing world peace. Those suggestions included treaties with individual countries, 
an international court, a referendum on war except in the case of an attack, and the 
reduction of armaments. Bryan’s attacks on the League to Enforce Peace, Ruhl J. Bartlett 
argues, provided the kindling in the mid-1910s that was used to support the isolationist 
argument during the League of Nations debate in 1919 and 1920.
63
   
 After examining the different points of view of five individuals, of whom all were 
political leaders and whose opinions held sway with different pockets of the population, it 
is clear this topic sparked a lot of controversy. The discussion surrounding the League to 
Enforce Peace became the forerunner to the later debate over the League of Nations. In 
essence, the league battle actually began in the mid-1910s, as those interested in 
establishing peace began to split into factions. This time period became crucial to 
developing ideas and the reasoning behind either agreeing to Wilson’s League of 
Nations, or not.  The immense size and influence of the League to Enforce Peace 
provided something similar to a forum that allowed Americans to open up and think 
critically not just of wartime issues, but also of their beliefs and values. The insightful 
discussions that emanated from the League to Enforce Peace helped to determine the 
perception of the United States’ role in the world.  
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The Paris Peace Conference 
World War One had a devastating effect on the entire world, particularly Europe. 
The war severely damaged the infrastructure and economies of the combatant nations.   
In the aftermath of the war, many politicians 
and statesmen from the Allied countries met in 
Paris to bring justice to the victims and attempt 
to divide the spoils of war. The most powerful 
men of the world at the time led the Paris Peace 
Conference: Prime Minister of France, Georges 
Clemenceau; Prime Minister of Great Britain, 
David Lloyd-George; and President of the 
United States, Woodrow Wilson.   
Being a historian, Wilson believed the underlying reason for the First World War 
was due to traditional imperialism – something he wished to prevent from reoccurring.64 
Prior to the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson outlined his plan for peace, known as the 
Fourteen Points. The Fourteenth Point was the League of Nations, which became the 
primary vehicle for changing the attitude of the world to one of continual peace. For 
Wilson, the League of Nations would be comprised of countries who would attempt to 
mediate conflicts between nations in an effort to prevent wars. Thus, the introduction by 
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Woodrow Wilson of the League of Nations was foreign to Europeans and served as an 
entity to disrupt their influence and power.
65
  
Wilson, a very idealistic man, introduced within the League of Nations Covenant 
the idea of self-determination: the universal right of people to set up their own 
government and to govern themselves. It would appear that the concept of self-
determination – the right of people to govern themselves – would have undermined and 
eliminated the imperialistic goals of countries such as Britain and France. However, this 
was not the case. The Paris Peace Conference continued to breed imperialism by naming 
various European countries as mandates over less-privileged countries for an 
indeterminate amount of time under the guise that someday they may acquire self-
determination and conduct their own affairs.  
 The introduction of “self-determination” was quite frightening, particularly to 
Europeans, because it was so vague. Even members of the American delegation were 
perplexed as to what Wilson meant when he said, “self-determination,” including 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lansing understood that Wilson meant something 
similar to the phrase “consent of the governed” that had been in-use for quite some time. 
He realized that statesmen from imperialistic nations were not fond of this phrase as it 
encroached upon their “national safety” due to the threat of revolt from their colonies. 
Yet, Lansing questioned the phrase “self-determination” wondering exactly what Wilson 
meant by it: “Does he mean a race, a territorial area, or a community?” However, Lansing 
also realized the implications behind Wilson’s usage of “self-determination,” stating: 
“The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite.” It appears that Lansing understood that all 
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eyes and ears from all nations, including colonized ones, were on Wilson. However, the 
phrase “self-determination” was not written into the League of Nations Covenant, 
begging Lansing’s questions of what was self-determination and who would receive it.66  
 Like Europeans, many Americans, particularly Republicans, were fearful of the 
League of Nations. They believed it would destroy American sovereignty and influence, 
namely the Monroe Doctrine. Thus, they pushed for the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine 
into the League of Nations Covenant. However, according to Wilson’s authorized 
biographer, Ray Stannard Baker, Wilson applied “traditional American policies,” 
including the Monroe Doctrine, when designing the League of Nations.
67
 Along these 
lines, Wilson countered his critics by claiming that the Monroe Doctrine was already 
embodied within the League of Nations Covenant, and that the League of Nations 
extended the Monroe Doctrine to the world.
68
 The urging of Republican senators to 
safeguard the Monroe Doctrine into the Covenant illustrates the idea that Republicans 
were just as concerned about self-determination as imperial Europe. The possibility of 
Latin America receiving true self-determination would prohibit the United States from 
playing “big brother” and interfering under the auspices of the Roosevelt Corollary.  
 Following the Great War, President Woodrow Wilson ventured across the 
Atlantic Ocean to take part in the Paris Peace Conference with the goal of preventing 
future wars. At this time, Wilson began his two-front battle to ensure the League of 
Nations’ survival. He fought Republicans within the United States and statesmen in Paris. 
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Embarking on his journey, Wilson took a plethora of American statesmen and diplomats 
to assist him in his endeavors to save humankind from future wars and oppression while 
delivering to the world a new way of living that would ensure peace and stability.  
Two of Wilson’s more prominent aides were his close friend and confidante, 
Colonel Edward M. House, and Secretary of 
State Robert Lansing. Wilson did not take any 
Republican members of the Senate with him to 
Paris, which caused much contention between 
Wilson and Republicans, namely Henry Cabot 
Lodge. For many Republicans, it would have seemed proper to invite Republican 
senators to the conference since the election of 1918 brought a Republican majority to 
Congress. Furthermore, under the Constitution, it was the Senate’s responsibility to ratify 
treaties. Wilson eventually named ex-diplomat Henry White as the Republican to the 
delegation. However, according to Wilson’s personal physician, Cary Grayson, and 
Robert Lansing, Wilson had a reason for not bringing any Republicans: he did not wish 
any opposition within the American delegation.
69
  
 For Wilson, the inclusion of the League of Nations in the peace treaty was of 
utmost importance. However, Europeans were not keen on the idea of a League of 
Nations. Therefore, neither British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George nor French 
Premier Georges Clemenceau appointed himself on the League of Nations committee, 
rather it was headed by Woodrow Wilson.
70
 According to Charles Seymour, in a letter 
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dated Saturday, February 15, 1919, without Wilson’s presence at the conference, the 
League “would have never been carried.”71  
 Early in the conference, Wilson developed a draft of the League of Nations 
Covenant. This draft contained an unarticulated clause regarding the Monroe Doctrine 
within Article III: “The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political 
independence and territorial integrity.” While the Monroe Doctrine was not mentioned by 
name, the substance of the article had the same effect, evident by the comment by David 
Hunter Miller, an American legal expert present at the conference. Miller stated that the 
above phrase did not protect the Doctrine, but rather nullified it. To solve this problem, 
Miller believed the Covenant “should contain an express recognition of the Monroe 
Doctrine.” However, it is interesting that in his suggested rewording of the Article, he did 
not mention the Doctrine by name, but described and guaranteed the continued function 
of the Doctrine.
72
 
 Later, in February 1919, Woodrow Wilson returned to the United States to be 
present for the closing of 65
th
 session of Congress so he could sign legislation into law. 
Two days after his return, Wilson hosted a dinner at the White House in which his guests 
were members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee. At this informal gathering, Wilson fielded questions from senators and 
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representatives with responses that were very frank and direct.
73
 During the evening, 
Wilson was informed of the desire by certain congressmen to see an expressed 
recognition of the Monroe Doctrine within the League of Nations Covenant. The 
president, however, believed no explicit mention of the Doctrine was necessary because 
the League of Nations was an extension of the Monroe Doctrine for the entire world.
74
  
 Additionally, while home, Wilson met with Senate Democrats to discuss the 
current strategy, which mainly focused on discovering which Republicans would most 
likely break from their party and vote with the Democrats on the Treaty. Scouting 
potential Republicans who would break from their party suggests there was no doubt that 
Senate Democrats would certainly vote for the Treaty. However, in order to capture the 
votes of swaying Republicans, Senator Thomas J. Walsh advised the president to make 
efforts to insert changes in the Treaty upon his return to Paris.
75
 Recognizing that the 
Covenant could be clarified, Wilson then requested advice from Walsh regarding 
suggestions as to where senators believed improvement was needed.
76
  
Walsh, however, was not the only Democrat who encouraged Wilson to amend 
the Treaty in order to secure Republican votes. Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, outgoing 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, also advised Wilson to the same effect. 
However, Hitchcock went further than Walsh by suggesting six different amendments 
that he believed would ensure Republican acceptance of the Treaty. These changes 
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included the ability of each government to have “exclusive control over domestic 
subjects,” “a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine,” a process to withdraw from the 
League, the right to decline trusteeship over a former colony, and a few instances of 
clearing up the language used in the Treaty.
77
 Each of these suggested amendments 
would allow the United States to retain its sovereignty, a major Republican criticism of 
the League.   
 One Republican senator, Porter James McCumber, broke ranks from his 
Republican majority and supported Wilson in the Senate. In his letter to the president, 
McCumber proposed three amendments regarding topics such as keeping domestic 
concerns out of the League’s jurisdiction, preserving each country’s “full, free and 
independent sovereign powers,” and safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine.78 Aside from 
Taft, McCumber was one of few Republicans who reached out to Wilson, illustrating 
little attempt from across the aisle at bi-partisanship. A staunch supporter of Wilson’s 
League, McCumber was hesitant to follow the lead of Henry Cabot Lodge, the new 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee once the 66
th
 Congress convened.   
In addition to Hitchcock and McCumber, Senator Samuel McCall of New Jersey 
also wrote to Wilson suggesting the Monroe Doctrine be recognized in the treaty, thereby 
allowing it to become “the public law of the world.”79 In response to McCall’s 
suggestion, Wilson believed it would “be worth while” to introduce the topic when he 
returned back to Paris. Furthermore, Wilson doubted his European colleagues would 
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object to the specific recognition of the Doctrine.
80
 It is clear that not only was Wilson 
open to suggestions in order to ensure the future ratification of the treaty, but also the 
issues of protecting the Monroe Doctrine and America’s sovereignty seemed to be a 
major factor in whether the Senate would ratify the treaty.   
Leaving nothing to chance, Lodge organized a campaign against Wilson’s League 
of Nations. He circulated a petition, known as the Round Robin, which was signed by 
thirty-seven senators who stated their disapproval of the proposed peace organization.
81
 
Resentful of Wilson’s League because they believed it would entangle the United States 
in European affairs and destroy America’s sovereignty over the Western Hemisphere, 
Republicans demanded the Monroe Doctrine be safeguarded within the League of 
Nations Covenant.  
A few days prior to returning to Paris, Woodrow Wilson and William Taft made a 
joint appearance at a pro-League rally at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York 
City on March 4. Wilson and Taft both criticized Republican opposition to the League of 
Nations. While Wilson did not make reference to the Monroe Doctrine, he countered 
Republican claims that the League of Nations would destroy the American foreign policy 
of not engaging in entangling alliances, put forth by George Washington. In countering 
this claim, Wilson stated that Washington would be pleased because the League of 
Nations would “disentangle all the alliances in the world.”82  
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 On the way back to Paris aboard the U.S.S. George Washington, journalist Ray 
Stannard Baker issued a memorandum related to the public opinion of the League of 
Nations. While Baker identified that the majority of public opinion favored the League, 
he believed the vagueness of the League’s ideals allowed the opposition to build a strong 
argument against it. To counter this, Baker suggested that Wilson needed to explain the 
workings of the committee so the public would understand the pressures Wilson 
encountered in Paris. Also, Baker believed that amendments for added clarity would be 
helpful in passage of the League by the Senate.
83
 
 On March 14, Wilson arrived back in Paris to resume the challenges of 
establishing the League of Nations. It could be assumed that Wilson, who desperately 
wanted to ensure the passage of the League of Nations in Europe and in the United 
States, would have heeded Republican senators’ advice in ensuring inclusion of certain 
amendments to the Covenant, one being the explicit recognition of the Monroe Doctrine. 
However, Wilson was a very stubborn, hard-headed individual who was very passionate 
about what he was trying to do, and was unwilling to acquiesce to the desires of his 
opponents.
84
  
 When Wilson returned to the peace conference, he had no intention of 
incorporating the Monroe Doctrine, in name, within the Covenant. He believed it was 
already implicit within the document, and that including it would be “yielding to the 
Senate.”85 For Wilson, this was not just a moral, but a political debate. He detested 
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Republican members of the Senate, and their recommendation of amendments gave him 
reason to uphold the Covenant as it was written.
86
 Wilson deplored his opposition so 
much that he blamed them for the state of his health. He once told Dr. Grayson: “ ‘My 
trouble is this, and I have worked it out myself: I am suffering from retention of gases 
generated by the Republican Senators – and that’s enough to poison any man.’ ”87 
Wilson’s opponents equally despised him, in particular the Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Henry Cabot Lodge. Prior to his first departure to Paris, 
Lodge gave Henry White, the Republican diplomat, a note to give to the European 
delegates instructing them not to follow through with Wilson’s wishes of establishing a 
League of Nations. That letter was never delivered.
88
  
 Nevertheless, Wilson wanted to obtain the passage of the League of Nations, and 
thus, “constrained by political necessity to go forward,” knew he needed to propose an 
amendment recognizing the Monroe Doctrine, but such an amendment would not come 
for almost a month.
89
 In drafting a Monroe Doctrine clause, Wilson realized the 
consequences of such an amendment. He recognized that the Monroe Doctrine had 
allowed the United States to use force to enter into Latin American republics.
90
 His 
acknowledgement of this intervention allowed by the Monroe Doctrine suggests the 
notion that a Monroe Doctrine clause would still provide the United States a medium to 
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enter countries in the Western Hemisphere and for America to retain its sphere of 
influence. In addition, the delegation agreed on the notion that if the Monroe Doctrine 
was explicitly protected within the League of Nations Covenant, other nations, 
particularly Japan, would insist on a similar doctrine for themselves, an issue the 
delegation did not approve.
91
 It is apparent that even the United States did not want other 
powers, such as the Japanese, to acquire more power and influence in the world, which 
would erode America’s imperial power in Asia.   
 Wilson continually received encouragement to include the Monroe Doctrine 
within the Covenant, particularly from former Republican president, William Howard 
Taft. In his note of March 18, Taft noted that the inclusion of the Doctrine would 
probably be enough for the Senate to ratify the treaty in its entirety, illuminating the 
importance of the Doctrine to Republican senators who valued its ability to allow the 
United States to have a sphere of influence. In his telegram, Taft included a possible 
amendment to be used: 
Any American State or States may protect the integrity of American territory and the 
independence of the government whose territory it is, whether the member of the League 
or not, and may, in the interests of American peace, object to and prevent the further 
transfer of American territory or sovereignty to any European or non-American power.
 92
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It is interesting that in Taft’s proposed amendment, the Monroe Doctrine is not explicitly 
mentioned by name, alluding to the assertion that the Doctrine did not have to be named, 
but instead a description or definition would be appropriate. 
 A few days later, Taft sent Wilson another telegram with further detailed 
explanations as to his suggestion regarding the Monroe Doctrine. Taft argued that the 
current state of the Covenant only covered members of the League. Knowing that there 
would be Latin American states that would not be directly admitted into the League, this 
provision Taft wrote would provide protection for them. In addition, it specified exactly 
the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, that “European or non-American” states should not 
seek further acquisition of American territory.
93
 Taft’s belief that he needed to further 
explain the purpose and implications of his amendment suggests the complexity and 
vagueness of the matter at hand. In addition, this illustrates the American desire to retain 
its sphere of influence over Latin America in the face of self-determination.  
Furthermore, Thomas Lamont, a member of the American peace delegation, 
wrote to Wilson and enclosed Senator Elihu Root’s thoughts on the League of Nations 
Covenant. Root acknowledged that due to the participation in the war, the United States 
had a hand in world affairs. However, the United States’ interest in world affairs 
stemmed from the expansion of the war in Europe. Conversely, Europeans should have 
no concern with American interests unless those matters threaten to spread and endanger 
world affairs. In writing this, Root begged a rhetorical question regarding the Monroe 
Doctrine’s authority. He believed the Doctrine had been diluted, but that America’s 
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primary interests remained in the Western Hemisphere and Europe’s primary interest 
remained in the eastern.
94
  
 Despite his dislike of Republican senators, Wilson finally hinted at the 
introduction of the Monroe Doctrine clause at the twelfth meeting of the League of 
Nations Commission. As the commission worked through the Covenant, Wilson retained 
the right to propose an amendment in the future to Article X which maintained that states 
should respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states.
 95
 It appears that 
Wilson had in mind an amendment preserving the Monroe Doctrine as it would fit nicely 
within the context of the existing article. 
 In fact, an amendment was in the process of being written by the American 
delegation, along with a member of the British delegation, Lord Robert Cecil. On March 
18, Wilson met with Colonel House and Cecil to discuss amendments to the League of 
Nations Covenant. At this meeting, a discussion of a Monroe Doctrine amendment 
occurred, which Lord Robert Cecil did not initially support, but eventually agreed to.
96
 
Cecil’s reluctance is odd because according to a New York Times article, published 
months before this meeting, he praised the Doctrine saying it had provided “satisfactory 
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results in practice which justifies its further application as a model of operation.”97 It is 
not clear as to why Cecil changed his mind, possibly due to the fact that in January the 
Covenant made no direct mention of the Doctrine, but was only modeled after it, and 
thus, Cecil objected to the inclusion of the name, not the principle.  
 Finally, Cecil approached Prime Minister Lloyd George regarding the Monroe 
Doctrine clause. According to Lloyd George, he could not make any decision without 
first discussing the matter with the British delegation, yet this was only to hide his real 
intentions. Being a seafaring nation with a number of colonies and dominions around the 
world, Lloyd George thought it best that Britain retain a large navy. Lloyd George 
viewed the League of Nations to be Wilson’s toy and believed Wilson would not be 
happy unless it was written into the treaty.
98
  Britain’s prime minister wanted to develop a 
strategy to use the Monroe Doctrine as a bargaining chip in order to keep the Americans 
from building up their navy against the British.
99
 However, Cecil urged Lloyd George to 
keep the Monroe Doctrine separate from the naval question because without the inclusion 
of the Doctrine, the chances of the United States ratifying the treaty were slim.
100
 While 
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Lloyd George was looking out for the welfare of his own nation, Colonel House referred 
to him as a “mischief maker” for his role in complicating Wilson’s plans.101 
 After Wilson learned of Lloyd George’s disapproval regarding the inclusion of 
the Monroe Doctrine without the American concession to the British regarding the 
building of ships, he was fairly calm. He was willing to risk his chances with the Senate 
without putting the Monroe Doctrine clause within the treaty.
102
 It appears that Wilson 
was more inclined to ensure the freedom of the seas, part of his Fourteen Points, rather 
than include a provision that preserved the Doctrine when the League of Nations was 
modeled on the Doctrine. Or possibly, Wilson saw his chance to tell Republican Senators 
that his request to include the Monroe Doctrine was denied, therefore he could 
triumphantly tell the Senate that he had done his best.  
 On April 10, Wilson received a telegram from the League to Enforce Peace, co-
written by Taft and Lowell. Within the message, the leaders of the peace organization 
stated their opinion that unless the Monroe Doctrine was protected in the Covenant, 
“Republican Senators will certainly defeat ratification of treaty.”103 It is doubtful that this 
telegram prompted Wilson’s action later that day. Nonetheless, the telegram serves as a 
reminder that the Republicans controlled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and 
inherently the decision whether the United States would join the League of Nations, or 
not.  
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Finally, in the late hours of April 10, Woodrow Wilson proposed the Monroe 
Doctrine amendment to the League of Nations Covenant: 
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international 
engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe 
Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace. 
 
Mr. Wellington Koo from the Chinese delegation and Mr. Reis and Mr. Larnaude from 
the French delegation had slight objections to the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine. Both 
delegations had reservations regarding the inclusion of the amendment for security 
reasons. However, Mr. Koo did not object to the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine by 
name, rather he disagreed with the term “regional understandings” as he feared it would 
allow Japan to create an Asiatic Doctrine and have an imperialistic influence over China.  
 The French delegation, conversely, did object to the inclusion of the Monroe 
Doctrine, as the amendment did not contain a precise definition of the Doctrine. Both Mr. 
Reis and Mr. Larnaude requested a definition of the Monroe Doctrine, as they were 
concerned whether or not the United States would come to the aid of France if attacked. 
Lord Robert Cecil acknowledged that while the Monroe Doctrine had never truly been 
defined and if it were to be defined, its scope would be limited or extended. Cecil further 
noted that the Doctrine was used only as an example of other regional understandings and 
that it did not prohibit the United States from coming to the future aid of Europe.
 104
  
Fearful that the Monroe Doctrine would not be included within the League of 
Nations Covenant, Wilson gave an impromptu and passionate speech “full of eloquence 
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and good sense” regarding the Doctrine.105 Wilson’s remarks, aimed at the French, 
reassured delegates that the Monroe Doctrine was in no way incompatible with the 
League of Nations Covenant. According to Wilson, if the Doctrine did violate the 
Covenant, then the Covenant had precedence over the Doctrine in American interests.
106
 
However, the French delegation was still frustrated that the Monroe Doctrine clause 
would be placed within Article X, which they believed guaranteed their security, so they 
requested that it be placed elsewhere within the Covenant.
107
 A new article was inserted, 
and the Monroe Doctrine clause became Article XXI.
108
  
One of the more interesting elements within Wilson’s speech of the Monroe 
Doctrine is his reasoning for why it should be included. Wilson stated: “You see, the 
whole object of this mentioning of the Monroe Doctrine is to relieve a state of mind and 
misapprehension on the other side of the water.”109 It is clearly evident that in his 
impassioned plea, Wilson referred to Republican Senators who requested the inclusion of 
the Doctrine. Wilson’s statement reinforces the fact that not only morality, but politics, 
played a factor in the peace conference. Wilson already believed that the Monroe 
Doctrine had been embodied within the Covenant, but was desperate to have the United 
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States Senate ratify the treaty, and thus, he was forced to request the inclusion of the 
Monroe Doctrine by name.  
The day after the Doctrine was inserted into the Covenant, the French delegates 
acted as if the question was still up for debate. They posed questions and amendments 
related to the further specification of the Monroe Doctrine. However, Wilson, Cecil and 
House did not entertain French requests and continued on with business.
110
  
 Learning of the inclusion of the Monroe 
Doctrine in the Covenant elicited a negative 
response from Latin American countries, such as 
Mexico and Honduras.
111
 A Honduran delegate, 
Mr. Bonilla, proposed an amendment to 
safeguard Latin America from intervention into 
their “internal government or administration” or 
actions that would “diminish their autonomy or 
wound their national dignity.”112 From this amendment, it appears that Mr. Bonilla 
referred to Wilson’s intervention into Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In 
addition to the Honduran delegate’s amendment proposal, the Mexican Ambassador 
declared that Mexico would not recognize the Monroe Doctrine, “nor any other which 
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attacks the sovereignty and independence of Mexico.”113 Both the actions of the Mexican 
ambassador and the Honduran delegate illustrate the apprehension by Latin American 
states of the Monroe Doctrine’s authorization for the United States to interfere in Latin 
America.   
 Not only were Latin American states unhappy, but Americans were not pleased 
with the language used in the Covenant. In a telephone message to Wilson, former 
president Taft and president of Harvard, Abbott Lowell, complained about the language 
used in the Monroe Doctrine clause, but offered no explanation.
114
 This does not seem to 
have been a personal disappointment because a few days later, Taft praised the clause, 
calling it “eminently satisfactory.”115 Perhaps Taft and Lowell meant that other 
Republican Senators who were already opposed to the League of Nations disagreed with 
the Monroe Doctrine clause, foreshadowing events to come.    
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Pro-League Senators  
As domestic and international events unfolded, 1919 became the worst time to 
marshal a treaty through the Senate.
116
 The November 1918 congressional election 
caused the Democrats to lose control in both houses of Congress and placed Wilson’s 
arch-nemesis, Henry Cabot Lodge, directly in the path of Wilson’s treaty. By the time 
Wilson returned from Paris in June 1919, the new Congress had convened and 
Republican senators were already in their new leadership positions, ready to tackle the 
peace treaty. The Democrats were not fully ready to fight, though. Their actions while 
Wilson was in Paris illustrate that they would take a defensive position, allowing the 
Republicans to call the shots. The Democrats’ lack of initiative and their reliance on 
parliamentary procedures to ratify the Treaty split both the Republicans and the 
Democrats on the League of Nations issue.  
Rather than rehash previous historians’ work in regards to the fight between 
Wilson and the Republicans, this chapter will focus on the tedious relationship between 
Wilson and his supporters in the Senate. As loyal as the Democrats were to Wilson 
throughout the war and the treaty-making process, many abandoned him in his moment 
of need. Much of this desertion was due not just to the lack of compromise on Wilson’s 
part, but to the poor leadership and lack of effective strategies developed by Democratic 
leaders.    
 Prior to the United States entering the war, it was no secret that President 
Woodrow Wilson had a plan for relieving the world of all future wars. In his speech to 
Congress on January 22, 1917, Wilson outlined his vision for future world order. His plan 
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included a League of Nations, comprised of countries committed to preserving peace 
through discussion instead of resorting to violence.  
 Wilson’s speech received a divided reaction. While many supported his vision for 
peace, others were outraged that Wilson would propose an idea that could cost the United 
States its sovereignty. One person in particular, William Jennings Bryan, had already left 
Wilson’s circle of support by resigning as secretary of state on June 9, 1915 amidst the 
succession of diplomatic notes to Germany regarding its use of unrestricted submarine 
warfare. A three-time presidential candidate, Bryan led the Democratic Party from 1900 
to 1912, espousing isolationist and pacifist ideas. The thought of a Democratic leader 
proposing to entangle the United States in any event or organization outside of the 
Western Hemisphere was virtually unthinkable. Rather, it was the Republican Party that 
believed the United States should take its rightful place among the nations as an imperial 
country. The acquisition of the Philippines and Hawaii, along with the Roosevelt 
Corollary, only strengthened this belief.
117
 
 True to their foreign policy beliefs, main-stream Republicans agreed with the 
ideas behind Wilson’s League of Nations. In 1910, former Republican president, 
Theodore Roosevelt declared his support for a “League of Peace” among the “great 
powers… not only to keep the peace among themselves, but to prevent, by force if 
necessary, its being broken by others.” Additionally, Roosevelt’s long-time friend, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, concurred with the need for a “united nations.” 118 However, neither of 
these men endorsed Wilson’s League of Nations, citing their belief that it would 
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jeopardize American sovereignty. Yet, another former Republican president, William 
Howard Taft, wholeheartedly supported Wilson’s League.  
 In light of the bi-partisanship between Wilson and Taft, the League of Nations’ 
approval in the United States seemed assured. Yet, Republican senators were unwilling to 
agree with Taft’s and Wilson’s notions. Furthermore, Democrats, previously led by 
Bryan, were not easily disposed to agree to an international organization. However, 
Wilson’s idealistic tendencies regarding peace made it easier for Democrats to agree with 
him. Additionally, the thought of not supporting their first two-term Democratic president 
since Andrew Jackson would be political suicide.
119
 In this sense, Democratic leaders 
were incredibly loyal to Wilson. In the end, this loyalty cost Wilson the League of 
Nations because the Democrats were too afraid to act independently of Wilson until the 
11
th
 hour of the League of Nations’ fight. By then, it was too late.  
 After his reelection in 1916, Wilson began to publicly show support for the 
League of Nations idea. Simultaneously, Republican leaders, such as Roosevelt and 
Lodge, started to criticize the president’s version of a League. This criticism and 
opposition continued and increased in intensity once Wilson reached Paris and began the 
task of negotiating a peace treaty with the European heads of government. With Wilson 
in Paris, Democrats had no one to lead them in defending the League of Nations from 
Republican attacks. Wilson’s supporters took it upon themselves to deflect criticism, but 
they were often left without clear directions or advice on the Treaty itself. When Treaty 
opponents criticized certain parts, such as their belief that the treaty nullified America’s 
sovereignty within the Western Hemisphere, Democrats could only vaguely announce 
that the treaty protected the Monroe Doctrine.  One of Wilson’s biggest blunders was his 
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choice not to take anyone from the Senate with him to negotiate the Treaty. Perhaps if he 
had, communication would have been more effective and directions made clearer, 
providing Democrats with more of an argument and defense.
120
 
 Nonetheless, Democrats attempted to please their leader and often wrote to him 
for guidance. However, the advice that returned from Paris was usually very vague. 
When Wilson’s private secretary, Joseph Tumulty, wrote to him requesting direction for 
the Democratic senators, Wilson responded by simply giving Democrats the authority to 
speak on behalf of the League. Without any definite position or details, supporters were 
left to speak in very general terms with nothing concrete to strengthen their position. 
When questioned about the League of Nations, the outgoing Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, replied that he was unable “to 
define what the League of Nations was to be, but that it was possible to say what it was 
not to be.” Clearly, Hitchcock was not as well-versed on the League as he should have 
been, but knew enough to explain that it would not be a “super-nation.”121 
 As Wilson continued to bargain with Europeans over the Treaty, fighting to 
include amendments to appease his opponents in the United States, League supporters at 
home continued to be barraged by critics. Again, with little knowledge as to the Treaty’s 
development in Europe, many were left desperately seeking answers to defend the 
League against what was believed to be unfounded attacks by members of the opposition. 
Serving as the acting secretary of state, Frank L. Polk sent an urgent plea to Secretary of 
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State Robert Lansing requesting that he send “secret proceedings” to assist Hitchcock in 
his endeavors to squash Republican opposition. Responding to this request, President 
Wilson concurred with the British opinion not to release the text of the Treaty as it was 
“subject to alteration until our discussions with the Germans are finished.”122 
 This decision only added fuel to the fire as Republicans continued to charge that 
the Treaty would limit American sovereignty by infringing on domestic issues and 
repealing the Monroe Doctrine. Again, Polk cabled Lansing requesting information to 
assist Democrats as they had “no adequate answer to the Republican attack and urges 
(most?) if not all of the treaty be given out…. [Senator Pomerene] and Hitchcock both 
urge that they (should?) have as much light on the subject as possible.” Once more, 
Wilson declined the request citing that “it would be a tactical blunder to publish the 
details” because the Treaty was not yet finished and thus changes could still be made to 
it.
123
 The continued lack of clear information and vague guidance left Democratic leaders 
unsure of what course they were to take and in some cases gave the appearance they were 
not supportive of the president’s actions in Paris.  
  In his diary, Dr. Grayson practically charged Senator Hitchcock and other 
Democrats with being disloyal to the president. Writing of the “organized campaign of 
misrepresentation,” Grayson objected to the “lack of efficient Democratic Senators” who 
were not “defend[ing] the President’s course until such time as he is able.” In particular, 
Grayson singled out Senator Hitchcock who now served as the unofficial minority leader 
in the Senate and the minority leader on the Foreign Relations Committee. According to 
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Grayson, Hitchcock “made it plain that he was not very familiar with the League of 
Nations covenant.” In reality, Hitchcock did not have much information about the Treaty 
because Wilson refused to provide any information. Truthfully, Grayson may have been 
more knowledgeable of the Covenant than Hitchcock because he served in Paris as 
Wilson’s personal physician.  
 Although Grayson’s accusations were harsh, his criticism had merit. The 
Democrats were fighting a defensive battle, led by none other than former President Taft.  
Being a Republican, Taft did not answer to Wilson, but the Senate Democrats were not 
about to speak without Wilson’s consent for fear of going against his wishes. Finally, 
Wilson cast some light onto the course his supporters were to take. In response to 
Republican opposition to Article X in the League of Nations Covenant, which was akin 
to an agreement enforcing collective security, Wilson told his supporters not to waver on 
that subject as “Article X of the Covenant is the king pin of the whole structure.” He then 
instructed Hitchcock and other Democrats to “take a most militant and agressive [sic] 
course, such as I mean to take the minute I get back.”124 At last, Wilson provided his 
supporters the chance to switch tactics and fight on the offense by declaring that there 
would be no surrender or compromise on Article X. Even with this new line of attack, 
Democrats still found it difficult to answer critics’ attacks on the League without any 
additional information.  
   In early June 1919, the Democrats’ situation worsened when Lodge publicly 
boasted that he had seen a secret copy of the Treaty. This startling revelation left 
Democrats unsure of what to do, again. Now that someone in New York had a copy of 
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the Treaty and Lodge knew it, Wilson’s argument for keeping the Treaty secret was 
spoiled. To make matters worse, a debate was ongoing in the Senate regarding a pending 
resolution to release the text of the Treaty to the public. Given the circumstances, 
Hitchcock was left in a dire predicament and sought advice regarding parliamentary 
procedure on how to handle the situation in the Senate. In the meantime, he also began an 
investigation to uncover how a copy of the Treaty was leaked.
125
 As a former journalist, 
this investigation was something at which Hitchcock could excel, and would not need 
advice to be successful. 
 Where Hitchcock was skilled in investigative journalism, he lacked in 
parliamentary skills as he requested advice in regards to the pending resolution. Pleased 
with Hitchcock’s initiative to launch an investigation of what Lodge had seen, Wilson 
wrote to Tumulty that the Treaty was still in “negotiation and subject to change.” In 
addition to Wilson’s note, Lansing communicated to Polk that the Democrats should 
oppose the resolution to make the Treaty public. According to Lansing, to vote for the 
resolution would be tantamount to suffering the wrath of Wilson as anyone “other than a 
State Department official who is found in possession of an official copy of the text of the 
Conditions of Peace should be regarded as guilty of a grave breach of faith.”126 Naturally, 
with that type of response, anyone would have been hesitant to step outside the bounds 
established by Wilson for fear of political retribution.   
 Still, the situation regarding the Treaty in the United States seemed bleak. With 
Wilson in Paris, Democrats suffered from a lack of efficient leadership owing to 
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Hitchcock’s reluctance to do anything without Wilson’s approval. Writing to Wilson, 
Tumulty lamented over the situation in the United States, characterizing it as a “great 
depression in our ranks here.” Additionally, Tumulty suggested to Wilson that upon his 
return, he should meet daily with friendly senators and members of the press to “push our 
programme forward.” In concurrence with Grayson’s earlier opinion, Tumulty advised 
Wilson: “we must take the offensive and never cease until our foe is driven back.” 
Clearly, Tumulty believed Wilson’s absence was a “tremendous handicap” to supporters 
of the League, but Wilson’s eventual return to the United States in early July 1919 would 
“be of great psychological value to us.” 127 Wilson’s return to the United States would lift 
the spirits of League supporters and relieve Democrats from the heavy burden of 
defending the Treaty without assistance.  
 After the German delegation signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, 
Wilson embarked on his journey across the Atlantic. He arrived in New York City on 
July 8, 1919, amidst a generous, heartwarming welcome that consisted of “the largest 
crowd that has ever greeted the President in this great metropolis.” Immediately, he went 
right to work by delivering a speech at Carnegie Hall, defending the Treaty against its 
opponents.
 128
 As Dr. Grayson believed, the president had a “Herculean” task to perform 
in order to convince the country and opponents to ratify the Treaty as it stood.
129
 
However, Republicans were already squirming to make changes in the League of Nations 
Covenant to the point of annulling America’s part to the Treaty.  
                                                 
127
 Joseph Patrick Tumulty to Woodrow Wilson, June 16, 1919, in Link, PWW, Vol. 60, 610-611.  
 
128
 From the Diary of Dr. Grayson, July 8, 1919, in Link, PWW, Vol. 61, 400 – 401. An Address in 
Carnegie Hall, July 8, 1919, in Link, PWW Vol. 61, 401 – 404.  
 
129
 From the Diary of Dr. Grayson, May 27, 1919, in Link, PWW, Vol. 59, 528 – 529.  
67 
 
 
 Wilson was already one step ahead of the Republicans. He considered any 
changes, whether amendments or reservations to the Treaty, synonymous with nullifying 
all of the work done in Paris. Any amendment or reservation that changed the substance 
of the Treaty would require “reconvocation of the Peace Conference.” 130 Wilson had a 
good reason for rejecting any suggestion to insert amendments or reservations to the 
Treaty. In Paris, the subject of reservations became a topic of conversation when the 
Chinese objected to a particular clause within the Treaty that gave Japan jurisdiction over 
the Shandong Province. In light of this situation, Mr. Wellington Koo, the leader of the 
Chinese delegation, requested to sign the Treaty with a reservation. However, European 
delegates responded that doing so would “invalidate the whole document.” Wilson 
implored the Europeans to allow reservations with the thought that “any sovereign Power 
could make reservations in signing.” However, French Prime Minister Georges 
Clemenceau held steadfast in his belief that “A Treaty which was signed with 
reservations was not a Treaty.”131 
 With this knowledge and background, Wilson had a delicate situation on his 
hands because Republicans, led by Henry Cabot Lodge, demanded reservations be placed 
into the Treaty prior to ratification. These reservations would require members of the 
peace conference to acknowledge and approve of the dissent, which according to Wilson 
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could prolong the waiting period, keeping the treaty from going into effect sooner than it 
could. In addition to several reservations that nullified America’s obligation to deploy 
forces to international conflicts, another provided the United States the sole jurisdiction 
over interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine.
132
 Afraid the League of Nations would be 
able to interpret the Doctrine and encroach upon America’s authority within the 
hemisphere, Republicans wanted to retain all rights to the Doctrine, including defining it.  
In order to achieve the necessary two-thirds vote, Democrats needed to persuade 
Republicans to join their ranks. Yet, the Republican leader’s insistence upon reservations 
caused concern among some supporters. Still, Wilson remained persistent that he would 
not accept any textual change to the Treaty, no matter how small. Senator Hitchcock 
echoed Wilson’s sentiments with his statement: “No compromise whatever is possible on 
the League of Nations.” Wilson and Democratic senators believed that if they held strong 
to their position, their opponents would acquiesce in the fight against the Treaty.
133
 
Additionally, the president had the support of his predecessor and his peace organization.  
 At this point, the League to Enforce Peace, headed by Taft, knew it needed to 
throw all of its support behind the president in order for the Senate to ratify the treaty. 
Throughout the summer and fall of 1919, the League to Enforce Peace began a massive 
lobbying effort on Capitol Hill to convince Senators to agree to the treaty without the 
reservations that Lodge proposed. During this time, the American Bar Association 
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endorsed the unconditional ratification of the peace treaty, which the League to Enforce 
Peace considered a major victory.
134
 
 In response to Wilson’s refusal to compromise, Republicans rallied around their 
leader and their staunch position to include reservations in the Treaty. Even a sympathetic 
supporter of Wilson, Senator Porter J. McCumber acknowledged the fact that “it would 
be necessary for that body [the Senate] to adopt ‘explanatory reservations’ in ratification 
of the treaty.”135 Slowly, but surely, Wilson began losing supporters as they recognized 
his unwillingness to compromise. This loss of support was something that Wilson could 
not afford, forcing him to remain vigilant in his efforts to promote the Treaty.  
 In an attempt to help him woo and court potential supporters, Wilson received 
guidance from various friends of the League. Much of the advice given to Wilson 
centered on the tone of his speeches. Both Taft, and Wilson’s son-in-law, William G. 
McAdoo, who incidentally also served as his secretary of treasury from 1913 - 1918, 
suggested that Wilson keep his speeches informative and refrain from attacking his 
opposition. Issuing harsh attacks on Republican senators, they argued, would push the 
debate into a partisan fight, which would only solidify Republican support.
136
 However, 
Wilson’s distrust of his opponents made it difficult for him to be amicable. 
 On July 10, 1919, Wilson strode into the packed Senate chamber alongside 
Senator Lodge, who offered to carry the Treaty for Wilson. To this, Wilson smiled and 
jokingly replied: “Not on your life.” In the Senate that day, Wilson commanded his 
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audience’s attention with a speech regarding his trials in Europe to get the peacemakers 
to come around to his way of thinking. Afterward, Wilson met with Democrats to discuss 
the current strategy in place to achieve ratification of the Treaty, specifically focusing on 
how to overcome the threat of reservations. Again, Wilson reiterated his position that he 
was opposed to any change in the Treaty. Recognizing that the Treaty was not perfect, 
Wilson told his supporters that it was a step in the right direction, particularly in regards 
to an international recognition of the Monroe Doctrine.
137
 
With Wilson back in the United States, Democratic senators transferred much of 
the onus of defending the Treaty to the president. Wilson wasted no time in getting to 
work by inviting members of the opposition to the White House for individual 
conferences. Beginning with friendly Republicans, such as McCumber, Colt, and Nelson, 
Wilson hoped to gauge their opinions of the League and impress upon them reasons why 
the Treaty should be ratified without reservations or amendments. Wilson’s strategy was 
to scope out those who would be willing to support him with the hope of making a dent in 
the Republican majority.
138
   
 However, many senators who met with Wilson were not very willing to change 
their viewpoints. Some even advised Wilson that he needed to compromise by accepting 
reservations to the Treaty. In reality, these individual conferences may have done more 
harm than good because it appears that many Republicans defended their views while 
talking to the president, which strengthened the Republican opposition. One senator, 
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George Norris, even declined Wilson’s invitation because he believed it would be a waste 
of his and the president’s time.139 
 It became apparent to Wilson that his meetings with Republican senators were not 
giving him the results he desired. The weight Wilson bore became heavier when 
Hitchcock returned to his home state for a short vacation. With all eyes on him, Wilson 
became truly perplexed as he decided his course of action. Addressing a letter to his son-
in-law, “My dear Mac:” Wilson told McAdoo of his struggles to decide “the method of 
action best calculated to bring about the right results in these difficult days.” In another 
letter to Thomas Dixon, Jr., a former classmate at Johns Hopkins, Wilson expressed most 
eloquently his attempts to convince the Senate to ratify the Treaty of Versailles: “The 
weight of this weary, unintelligible world is great enough anyhow on those of us poor 
devils who have to take some part in straightening things out.”140  Clearly, Wilson 
understood that his strategy was not working and that he needed to attempt a different 
line of attack. Even more so than before, Wilson began seeing his own supporters pull 
away from his position.  
 According to Senator Key Pittman, Democrat from Nevada, the Republicans 
continued to gain support for treaty reservations. Additionally, Thomas Lamont, who 
served as a delegate to the peace conference from the United States Treasury, wrote to 
Wilson that the opposition was becoming more favorable among members of the public. 
However, Lamont cautioned Wilson not to make a trip across the country giving 
                                                 
139
 “Wilson Told League Cannot Pass Intact,” Washington Post, July 19, 1919, in Link, PWW Vol. 
61, 544 – 547. George William Norris to Woodrow Wilson, July 21, 1919, in Link, PWW Vol. 61, 570.  
 
140
 “Leaves League Fight,” Washington Post, July 12, 1919 in Link, PWW Vol. 61, 468 – 469; 
Woodrow Wilson to William Gibbs McAdoo, July 15, 1919 in Link, PWW Vol. 61, 480; Woodrow Wilson 
to Thomas Dixon Jr., August 2, 1919, in Link, PWW Vol. 62, 115.  
72 
 
 
speeches. Doing so, Lamont believed, would only increase the partisanship. Lamont 
advised Wilson to explain to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the advantages of 
the Treaty and why their reservations toward the Treaty were unfounded.
141
 
 The greatest blow to Wilson, however, came from within his own camp. After he 
inquired from an international lawyer about the power of reservations, Secretary of State 
Robert Lansing encouraged Wilson to compromise with moderate Republicans and 
accept mild reservations. As Lansing recalled, Wilson’s face took on a “stubborn and 
pugnacious expression” as he flatly rejected Lansing’s proposal. 142 To receive this advice 
from a cabinet member whom Wilson believed supported him in his endeavors was 
nothing short of betrayal.  
Yet, Wilson continued to receive the same information from all sides. Again, on 
August 15, 1919, Senator Pittman wrote Wilson of the retracting support from within the 
Senate. As Pittman told Wilson, some supporting senators were willing to accept 
reservations just to ratify the Treaty.
 143
 Why Democrats began to defect from Wilson’s 
position is puzzling. Did those who accepted reservations do so because they believed the 
Treaty to be good and righteous and wanted to see it ratified in any form possible? Or did 
they, too, begin to see issues in the Treaty that could only be rectified with reservations?  
Regardless of why senators began supporting reservations, Wilson clearly knew 
he had a problem on his hands. Following Lamont’s advice, Wilson invited the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to the White House for a luncheon conference on August 
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19, 1919. During this meeting, Wilson made perhaps his worst blunder: he indicated that 
he would accept “interpretations accompanying the act of ratification.” At the time, 
Wilson’s suggestion of interpretations was part of the Democrats’ offensive strategy. In 
an August 15 letter to Wilson, Tumulty suggested the president offer a “compromise by 
way of interpretative resolutions.” This proposal, Tumulty believed, would place the 
Republicans in a delicate position where they would be the ones to blame if they did not 
agree to a compromise.
144
 In reality, this small admission gave Republicans the hope that 
Wilson might genuinely consider reservations in the Treaty. Instead of showing Wilson’s 
ability to compromise, this strategy actually set him up for failure because it 
demonstrated to members of the opposition that Wilson was willing to make concessions 
to the Treaty.  
To make matters worse, Wilson went against the advice to not make a tour of the 
country speaking about the League, which he earnestly wished to do. Both he and his 
supporters believed that if the public would support the Treaty, then Americans would 
convince their elected senators to also support ratification of the Treaty without 
reservations or amendments.
145
 Prior to embarking on this trip, Wilson gave Senator 
Hitchcock a memorandum outlining the interpretations that he would accept should 
members of the opposition decide to compromise while he toured the country. The four 
interpretations acceptable to Wilson included: “the right of a Member State to withdraw 
[from the League],” the ability of each country to not heed the advice of the League in 
regards to the “employment of armed force,” the League did not have jurisdiction over 
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“immigration, naturalization, or tariffs” within individual member states, and the 
assurance that nothing in the League of Nations Covenant would affect the “application 
of the Monroe Doctrine in the American Hemisphere.”  
Wilson’s interpretations would have a different effect than the Republican 
reservations because an interpretation defined exactly how the United States understood 
certain passages in the Treaty, whereas a reservation meant the rejection of a part in the 
Treaty. The president made it perfectly clear to Hitchcock that no one needed to know 
who developed these interpretations, and that Hitchcock could claim to have written them 
himself. Hitchcock’s problem, though, was that Wilson instructed him not to use the 
interpretations until it became absolutely necessary. It appears that Wilson wanted to 
provide Hitchcock with an alternate plan in the event that the Senate rejected the 
unaltered Treaty while he traveled the country.
146
   
While on his western trip in September 1919, Wilson often gave more than one 
speech each day to enormous crowds that gathered to hear him talk about the Treaty of 
Versailles. Both he and his supporters believed the large number of people who heard 
him speak correlated with a favorable opinion of the president. Yet, one incident 
demonstrated that not everybody who came to hear the president actually agreed with 
him or had an interest in his message. While giving a speech in Salt Lake City, Wilson 
received applause from the audience when he spoke of the Republican reservations. After 
rebuking the audience for supporting the Republican position and then stating his 
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rejection of reservations, the audience again erupted in applause.
147
 It seems, in this one 
incident, the public was more interested in seeing the president than in showing support 
for either his or the Republican position.
148
 Additionally, members of Wilson’s 
opposition attempted to counteract the president’s actions by following him on his 
western tour, giving speeches that criticized the League. Like Wilson, the Republicans 
also attracted large crowds.
149
  
Throughout his tour, Wilson defended himself by professing that he did not 
understand the Senate’s refusal to ratify the treaty even after he had made such important 
concessions to them, namely, the Monroe Doctrine. Wilson also went so far as to claim 
that the Republican senators were unable to read. While speaking in St. Louis, Missouri 
about Republican opposition to the treaty, Wilson stated: “On this side is the English and 
on that side is the French, and since it is evident that some men do not understand 
English, I hope that they understand French.”150 
On one of his first stops in Des Moines, Iowa, Wilson responded to his critics’ 
question of what other “regional understandings” might be present with the following 
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statement: “we do not know of any other regional understandings like it.”151 However, in 
making this statement, Wilson either outright lied, or due to the stress placed upon him 
which caused a strain on his already poor health, he may have simply forgotten the April 
10 statement by Lord Robert Cecil that “So far as the British Empire is concerned there 
are other understandings. . . . the ancient understanding concerning Arabia.”152 Cecil did 
not specify as to what understanding he meant by this. However, it can be assumed that 
he referred to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which further solidified the British influence in 
the Arab world by providing it control over Arabia and allowed the French to gain 
influence over Syria.   
Day after day, Wilson continued to speak, often while enduring excruciating 
headaches. After experiencing what appeared to be a small stroke early in the morning of 
September 26, 1919, he was forced to return to 
the White House. Forty-eight hours later, 
Wilson’s train pulled into Union Station, 
where the president was photographed walking 
to his presidential limousine. Under Dr. 
Grayson’s orders to rest and recuperate from 
the strain of his trip across the United States, 
Wilson was confined to the White House. A 
few days after his return to the capital, Wilson 
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suffered a major stroke on October 2, 1919. This stroke caused paralysis on his left side, 
leaving Wilson bedridden for the foreseeable future.
153
 The severity of Wilson’s medical 
emergency was not released to the public, or even to certain government officials. For the 
next few months, Mrs. Wilson, Dr. Grayson, and Tumulty served as the gatekeepers to 
the President of the United States. Not a single piece of information or person made it to 
Wilson without first making it past his wife, his doctor, or his private secretary.    
 Naturally, Wilson’s massive stroke on October 2 caused a bit of a panic among 
leaders in Washington. Seizing control, Lansing called a cabinet meeting to discuss the 
president’s acute medical situation and to contemplate the possibility of Vice-President 
Thomas Marshall serving as president. While nothing substantial resulted from this 
meeting, the fact that Lansing called a cabinet meeting demonstrates the severity of the 
situation. Due to being incapacitated, Wilson could no longer lead the fight for the 
Treaty. Now, it was up to the Democrats in the Senate to carry on Wilson’s mission.154  
 Ever loyal to the president, Hitchcock continued to lead Wilson’s fight in the 
Senate. However, he, too, saw the need for reservations in order for the Treaty to pass. 
Ultimately, it came down to the logistics of voting. Forty-nine Republicans and six 
Democrats favored the Treaty with reservations, while only forty-one senators supported 
the Treaty without reservations. Clearly, members of the opposition outnumbered league 
supporters.
155
   
To combat the problem of overcoming the odds, Hitchcock concocted a plan he 
believed would make the Democrats successful in securing enough votes to ratify the 
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Treaty. In a letter to former President Taft, Hitchcock proposed defeating the Lodge 
reservations and then offering suggestions for the Senate to consider. He believed the 
Democrats’ suggestions would “become the basis of a compromise between 40-odd 
democrats who want the Treaty ratified and 25 or 30 republicans.” In order to be 
successful though, Hitchcock knew the Lodge reservations needed to be defeated first so 
that “men now bound by promises to support the Lodge resolution are released by its 
defeat.” In other words, Hitchcock wanted to get the Lodge reservation off the table to 
force those who supported the Treaty to vote for it with the Democrats’ interpretations.156  
In a similar letter to Mrs. Wilson, which she read to the president, Hitchcock 
provided a slightly different plan. Perhaps Hitchcock erred in his letter to the First Lady, 
or maybe he wanted to discover the president’s reaction to the possibility of the Treaty 
not being ratified at all. In his letter to Edith Wilson, Hitchcock confessed his belief that 
Wilson’s treaty would be rejected as well as a version of the Treaty with substitute 
reservations offered by the Democrats. Then, Democrats would overwhelmingly reject 
the Lodge reservations as well. Essentially, Hitchcock proposed to kill the Treaty. 
However, he also inquired of Wilson whether his supporters should be instructed to vote 
for the Lodge reservations.
157
 With Hitchcock’s knowledge of the growing Republican 
support in the Senate, it is possible that he needed to know how willing Wilson would be 
to accept Lodge’s changes to the Treaty.   
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A few days after sending his letter to Mrs. Wilson, Hitchcock met with the 
president at the White House in Wilson’s bedroom, with Dr. Grayson present. The 
president demonstrated a keen mind and an adamant position that the Lodge reservations 
were unacceptable. However, it is clear that Wilson’s wife and Dr. Grayson shielded him 
from much of the Treaty debate as Wilson told Hitchcock: “I have been kept in the dark 
to a certain extent except what Mrs. Wilson and Doctor Grayson have told me, and they 
have purposefully kept a good deal from me.”158 With Wilson literally on his back, it was 
now up to Hitchcock to marshal the Treaty through the Senate. Yet, from this meeting, it 
was also apparent to Hitchcock that Wilson retained his mental faculties, which 
prevented Hitchcock from acting entirely independent of the president.  
In what seems to be an attempt to mask the president’s illness and have Wilson 
appear to remain in control, Hitchcock drafted a letter to himself, which he sent to Mrs. 
Wilson for the president’s approval. Once Wilson approved the letter stating his position 
that the Lodge reservations were equivalent to “nullification of the treaty,” he then sent it 
back to Hitchcock to use as an official declaration of the president’s position.159 Again, it 
seems that Hitchcock wanted to please Wilson instead of acting on his own. By forming a 
letter to be sent back to him, Hitchcock trapped himself into arguing for the president’s 
position even though he knew support for the unaltered Treaty continued to dwindle.   
 As time wore on, it appeared to Taft that in order to be successful, he would have 
to break from the League to Enforce Peace’s official stance and join the Lodge camp by 
proposing his own reservations to the treaty. While this might seem like Taft turned his 
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back on the League and Wilson, he did so to hopefully coerce the reservationists to 
accept the treaty, thereby becoming a member of the League of Nations. Taft’s break 
with the official League to Enforce Peace position caused some confusion as to what the 
League supported. However, in November 1919, the League also threw its weight behind 
the Lodge reservations with the hope of saving the League of Nations. As history shows, 
Taft’s flexibility did not advance the cause of the League of Nations and as Ruhl Bartlett 
argues, led to the demise of any possibility of having a league.
 160
 
The results of the Democrats’ lack of efficient leadership regarding the Treaty, as 
well as their reluctance to act independently of the president, shone through on November 
19, 1919 when the Senate voted for both the Lodge resolution and the unconditional 
ratification of the Treaty. Both the Republicans’ and the Democrats’ resolutions failed to 
achieve a two-thirds vote. The Senate even rejected the interpretative reservations that 
Wilson provided to Hitchcock a few months prior.
161
 Still, the Democrats remained 
hopeful that the Senate would ratify the Treaty when Wilson returned it to the Senate for 
reconsideration.  
Those supporting Wilson in his fight for the Treaty, however, were victims of 
wishful thinking. In the beginning of 1920, Wilson’s private secretary told him, “in my 
opinion we cannot longer adhere to the position we have taken in the matter of the 
Treaty.” Tumulty even suggested that Wilson offer an olive branch; doing so would cause 
the Republicans to be at fault for refusing to negotiate a compromise. Additionally, 
Hitchcock concurred with Tumulty, in his letter of January 5 to Mrs. Wilson, by stating: 
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“It seems to be our policy should be to do everything that will help increase that dozen 
[friendly Republican senators] to twenty.” Hitchcock believed the only way to do that 
though would be to offer a treaty with reservations.
162
  
Even as Wilson’s supporters attempted to work officially and unofficially with 
Republicans on a compromise, Wilson continued to grow more adamant in his position 
that the Democrats should not seek compromise – they should hold firm to their position. 
However, support for an unconditional ratification of the Treaty was “rapidly 
disintegrating” according to Tumulty. Democrats were ready to compromise with 
Republicans and accept reservations in order to secure ratification of the Treaty. Wilson 
even became unhappy with the reservations proposed by Democrats, believing they 
“would chill our relationship with the nations with which we expect to be associated in 
the great enterprise of maintaining the world’s peace.”  The reluctance of the president to 
accept any compromise caused great distress among his supporters to the point that many 
decided to break from his position and yield to Republican reservations.
163
 
Eventually, William McAdoo planned to speak with his father-in-law and 
encourage him to agree with the Lodge reservations. This, however, was to no avail. 
Nothing would change the president’s mind. On March 19, 1920, exactly four months 
after the first vote on the Treaty, the Senate again took up the issue of ratifying the 
Treaty. This time, the Senate only considered the Lodge reservations. Again, both the 
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Table 1: Break-down of votes on March 19, 1920 regarding the 
Lodge reservations. 
              (Cooper, Breaking the Heart of the World, 367, 368) 
Democrats and the Republicans were split and the resolution failed to achieve the 
necessary two-thirds by a deficit of seven votes.
164
 
Party Yes No 
Republicans 26 11 
Democrats 23 24 
 
 
For Wilson, his dream of the United States accepting the Treaty of Versailles was 
lost. He accepted what he believed to be God’s decision for the Senate to reject the 
League of Nations.
165
 The Democrats, on the other hand, continued to fight and made the 
League of Nations part of the 1920 presidential election by advocating for it within their 
platform. However, the election of the Republican candidate, Warren G. Harding, 
perished the thought that the United States might ever enter into the League of Nations. 
The dispute over the Treaty of Versailles provides evidence that demonstrates the shift in 
American foreign policy from an internationalist position, with the Roosevelt Corollary, 
to the rejection of a major position in the League of Nations.  
While it is true that Wilson’s health crisis served as a major factor in his inability 
to lead the fight for the League of Nations, an analysis of the relationship with his 
supporters in the Senate provides conclusive evidence that the Democrats were held back 
by Wilson’s desire to pass the Treaty without reservations. Even more so, the reluctance 
of Hitchcock and other Democratic leaders to move forward with the Treaty became just 
as disastrous as Wilson’s unwillingness to compromise. With historical events, it is only 
possible to speculate what could have happened. If Hitchcock had introduced his 
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interpretative resolutions earlier, before the moderate Republicans pledged their loyalty 
to Lodge, there is a chance that the Democrats could have garnered enough votes to ratify 
their version of the Treaty. In the end, Treaty supporters yearned not just to prevent all 
future wars, but also to end Wilson’s war of attrition in the Senate. 
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A Transparent Veil of Isolation 
A combination of Wilson’s poor health, his reluctance to compromise with the 
Republicans, and the poor leadership skills of Gilbert Hitchcock contributed to the 
downfall of the Treaty within the Senate. Even if Wilson’s health had not failed him and 
he was able to lead his supporters in their fight for the League, the Republican opposition 
was such that it would have been a divine miracle for the Treaty to have passed without 
reservations. Still, putting the power politics aside, there seems to be a fundamental 
difference between Wilson and Henry Cabot Lodge regarding their views toward the 
League. Their divergent opinions hark back to their perception of the United States as an 
international leader. Thus, the underlying reasoning for the Senate’s rejection of the 
Treaty stemmed from the Republican expansionist position. To see all of these hidden 
connections, we must revisit America’s entrance into the imperial age.  
At the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898, Theodore Roosevelt left 
his cushy job as assistant secretary of the navy to lead a cavalry regiment, known as the 
Rough Riders.
166
 His experiences as a sheriff and a police commissioner in New York 
City led him to believe his role as an American soldier in Cuba was to bring the light of 
humanity upon those oppressed and to spread democracy as well as establish law and 
order. In a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt not only told the senator of his heroic 
deeds in battles, but also stressed the importance of fighting for Cuba’s independence and 
the urgent need to acquire Spanish territories.  
According to Roosevelt, the United States should not “make peace until we get 
Porto Rico [sic], while Cuba is made independent and the Philippines at any rate taken 
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from the Spaniards.” In a later letter, dated June 12, 1898, Roosevelt again told his friend 
on the Foreign Relations Committee: “You must get Manila and Hawaii; you must 
prevent any talk of peace until we get Porto Rico [sic] and the Philippines as well as 
secure the independence of Cuba.” Unwilling to accept an armistice, Roosevelt embraced 
the notion that wars should be won, not ended. He believed that the United States should 
not only be victorious in the war, but should reap the spoils of war, as well.
167
 
In full agreement with his Harvard educated friend, Lodge noted that he was “in 
no hurry to see the war jammed through. We shall come out better if we take our time.” 
Anxious to see the United States expand its horizons, Lodge wrote that the United States 
“ought to take Porto Rico [sic] as we have taken the Philippines and then close in on 
Cuba. Let us get the outlying things first. The Administration [McKinley’s] I believe to 
be doing very well and to be following out a large policy.” 168 Lodge’s use of the term, 
“large policy” is comical because it served as his euphemism for American imperialism 
to the effect that the United States was enlarging its territory and sphere of influence.   
The expansionist notions held by Roosevelt and Lodge did not dissipate as time 
wore on since both men continued to advocate that the United States should have an 
increased presence in the world. Both men were rooted in the belief that the United States 
should occupy a position of power and influence in the world. As Roosevelt once told an 
audience in Chicago, “We must strive in good faith to play a great part in the world.” In 
order to accomplish this, Roosevelt advised that the United States “cannot sit huddled 
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within our own borders.”169 As he perceived it, Americans could not make an impact on 
the world if the country assumed a position of isolation. Therein laid his problem: the 
United States was hindered by its traditional policy of non-interference. Many attributed 
this policy to the Monroe Doctrine, which forbade European colonization of the Western 
Hemisphere. By this same token, Americans believed they should not interfere in matters 
beyond the Atlantic or Pacific.
170
  
For Roosevelt, to discount the Monroe Doctrine and say it was no longer 
applicable would have been unspeakable. Instead, he enlarged the Doctrine by increasing 
its scope. While his decision to enlarge the United States authority within the hemisphere 
stemmed from the 1902 Venezuelan financial crisis, the Roosevelt Corollary was much 
more than protecting Latin American countries from their investors. It was a way for him 
to reach out to the world. He did not wish the United States to be a beacon of light 
shining upon the world from its position of isolation, but rather he believed Americans 
should bring light to underdeveloped countries by establishing orderly governments using 
the United States as a model. According to Roosevelt, expanding the influence of the 
United States would do a “duty to civilization far greater and more important than could 
have been done by any stationary power.”171 In order to make great strides in the world, 
Roosevelt believed the United States needed to loosen the shackles of the Monroe 
Doctrine by enlarging it so it would be more flexible.  
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As author Jay Sexton elucidates, Roosevelt skillfully articulated the purpose of 
the Monroe Doctrine as defending less fortunate nations. The Doctrine already contained 
an air of imperialism as the United States reigned supreme over the Western Hemisphere, 
but the addition of Roosevelt’s corollary augmented the implied imperialism. To combat 
this, Sexton asserts, Roosevelt shrouded his corollary in terms of assistance for less 
fortunate nations. For example, the American intervention into Columbia provided 
Panama its independence, while simultaneously propping up American enterprise and the 
world economy by securing the construction of the Panama Canal.
172
 This idea of 
assisting another nation, while also procuring benefits for the United States, highlights 
Roosevelt’s thinking. In a speech titled, “National Duties”, which he addressed to the 
crowd at the Minnesota State Fair in 1901, Roosevelt insisted, “our duty is twofold, that 
we must raise others while we are benefitting ourselves.”173 His blatant statement made 
clear his belief that the United States should engage only in activities that would be 
mutually beneficial to the country and the lesser power.  
Insofar as Roosevelt wished the United States to “put down savagery and 
barbarism” throughout the world, he relied on the United States naval forces to 
accomplish this objective. As assistant secretary of the navy, Roosevelt oversaw the 
building of updated, modern war vessels. Later, as president of the United States, he sent 
the navy on a tour of the world as a show of strength and power. When the Great White 
Fleet returned to America’s shores, Roosevelt wrote that the United States military was 
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“in such shape that there was no people that would have ventured to wrong us.”174 
Pleased with the military that he helped to strengthen, Roosevelt was proud of placing the 
United States in a position of global prominence by building up the naval forces.  
Roosevelt’s belief that the nation should have an adequate military went hand-in-
hand with his belief in preparedness. For him, this preparedness was not just for defense, 
but also served as a tool for peace. Once, he wrote, “It is only the warlike power of a 
civilized people that can give peace to the world.” 175  From his assertion, Roosevelt 
believed that peace could only be attained by developed countries, but only after others 
who possessed superior military power tamed those nations.  
On another level, though, Roosevelt’s statement implied his idea that a strong, 
adequate military could serve as insurance against war. Roosevelt thought the chances 
that a peaceful nation, such as the United States, would be attacked were less if the 
aggressor nation believed it would lose. This notion served as the basis of Roosevelt’s 
international peace plan, which he formally introduced within his Nobel Peace Prize 
acceptance speech in May 1910.
176
 Like his opponent in the 1912 presidential election, 
Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt developed his own peace plan. Unlike Wilson’s, his plan 
called for the threat of force to maintain peace throughout the world.  
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As historian John Milton Cooper, Jr. points out, both Wilson and Roosevelt were 
alike in their idealism regarding peace, but each differed regarding how to attain that 
peaceful coexistence between nations. In fact, as Wilson called for a League of Nations, 
Roosevelt advocated for a League of Peace. Both leagues were comprised of nations 
dedicated to ensuring peace throughout the world. Wilson’s league, however, was based 
mainly on a discussion of peace, whereas Roosevelt’s idea of a league was founded on 
the threat of force.
177
 
As Europe erupted into war during the summer of 1914, Roosevelt began 
advocating for preparedness on the part of the United States. True to his belief in military 
readiness, the ex-commander-in-chief insisted the country begin to prepare for war. 
While pacifists, such as Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, cried isolation, 
Roosevelt issued a call for the United States to be ready to defend the vital interests of the 
United States – namely, its possessions and the Panama Canal. As a Republican leader, 
Roosevelt was not the only to urge preparedness.  
In February 1915, the House of Representatives defeated an amendment to the 
Naval Appropriation Bill, which would have reduced the navy from two additional 
battleships to one. Of the 155 members who voted against an increase in the navy, 139 
were Democrats. This vote provides evidence that a majority of Republicans followed 
Roosevelt’s line of thinking in regards to preparedness and increasing America’s naval 
strength. Additionally, Lodge recognized the United States was no longer in a state of 
isolation as he declared: “The ocean barrier which defended us in 1776 and 1812 no 
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longer exists.”178 Clearly, Roosevelt and Lodge understood the need for the United States 
to be ready to fight.  
Even more so, both Republican leaders confessed their desire not only for an 
Allied victory, but also for the United States to enter on the side of the Allies. In a letter 
to Lodge on February 18, 1915, Roosevelt expressed his disgust with the president. 
Believing Wilson’s administration to be the “very worst and most disgraceful we have 
ever known,” Roosevelt complained of what he believed to be Wilson’s inability to face 
reality by failing to adequately prepare the country’s military for the possibility of war. 
Criticizing Wilson’s reluctance to do anything but write letters to Germany condemning 
the use of unrestricted submarine warfare, Roosevelt wrote, “The deaths of these men and 
women are primarily due to President Wilson’s policy of timidity and weakness.”  A year 
after the Lusitania sunk, Roosevelt told Lodge: “I would have accepted war” after the 
invasion of Belgium and the sinking of the Lusitania. His statement demonstrates his 
willingness to commit military forces outside of the Western Hemisphere not only to 
avenge the deaths of “innocent American women and children” on board the British 
passenger ship, but to also defend the honor of a neutral country.
 179
    
Concurring with Roosevelt’s belief about the need to declare war, Lodge found 
himself embroiled in a fist fight with German pacifists in the halls of Congress after one 
of the peace advocates called him “a damned coward.” To this, Lodge replied by hitting 
the man and saying, “You are a damned liar.” According to a Washington Post article, the 
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fight between Lodge and the German pacifist was not the only excitement that day as 
1,000 peace supporters protested on the steps of the Capitol. This incident illustrates that 
as the United States inched closer toward the war, many in the country harbored deep 
feelings either toward joining the fight or remaining in isolation. However, the political 
party that sought to become embroiled in the Great War became the party that cried 
isolation after the war.
180
  
 Lodge’s fear that the United States would lose its isolationist identity and become 
entangled in a web of European wars prompted him to propose a number of reservations 
to the Treaty of Versailles. Of the reservations Lodge proposed, one focused exclusively 
on the ability of the United States to define the Monroe Doctrine. This ability would 
allow the country to continue its spheres of influence by claiming it had jurisdiction 
through the Doctrine as it had done in previous years. An examination of this topic over a 
period of several decades indicates that the mainstream Republican Party, led by Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge, switched from being the international, interventionist party to 
recoiling back into the Western Hemisphere and returning to its isolationist shell by the 
end of World War One.  
 Acknowledging a noticeable shift in Republican foreign policy, historian John 
Milton Cooper, Jr. credits this change to politics. He argues that because the Democrats 
controlled the White House, Republicans opposed Wilson’s position.181 This is not 
necessarily the case. While politics and drama certainly played a role in the Senate’s 
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defeat of the Treaty of Versailles, long-standing Republican foreign policy from 
Roosevelt’s administration rose to the surface.  
 Throughout World War One, Theodore Roosevelt denounced Wilson’s League of 
Nations. His belief in a peace-keeping organization, such as the one he introduced in May 
1910, was founded on the ability to use force to maintain peace. In his book, America and 
the World War, written in 1915, Roosevelt wished the United States to “become one of 
the joint guarantors of world peace” by being “willing to act as a member of the 
international posse comitatus to enforce the peace of righteousness as against any 
offender big or small.”182 In that quote, Roosevelt stated his conviction that the United 
States should become involved in military engagements within the international 
community to defend those countries who were in the wrong. At a bare minimum, 
Roosevelt suggested nothing more than a worldwide defense treaty, or collective security, 
but he certainly did not advocate isolationism.  
 Since Roosevelt advocated not only for preparedness and eventually military 
intervention into the Great War, he was also willing to commit the United States armed 
forces as part of an international body of nations dedicated to preserving peace through 
force. Yet, once the League of Nations Covenant reached the United States Senate, with 
the clause that member states would defend other nations’ territorial integrity, 
Republicans balked at overseas commitments. One of the reservations Lodge proposed 
stated: “The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between 
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nations.”183 The peace organization’s authority to use the militaries of League members 
cannot be the true reason why Lodge refused to join without reservations. It was, 
however, a piece of the larger puzzle.  
 Lodge and other mainstream Republicans claimed isolation for the United States, 
not from their supposed fear of military intervention, but rather due to their reliance on 
the Monroe Doctrine to keep European states on their side of the Atlantic and allow the 
United States to retain control over the Americas. In 1920, Arnold Hall, a political 
science professor, wrote that critics derided the League of Nations for supposedly 
nullifying the foreign policy established by Monroe in 1823. Becoming a member of the 
League would force the United States to give up its suzerainty of the Western 
Hemisphere.  
Yet, just as Lodge declared prior to entering the war that the Atlantic did not 
protect America from European events, Hall recognized that the United States was no 
longer in isolation and Republican attacks were nothing but a farce. Agreeing with 
Wilson’s argument during the League fight, Hall asserted that the Covenant served as a 
Monroe Doctrine for the world as it would seek justice on behalf of a member if its land 
were attacked by an aggressor nation.
184
 Since the Doctrine was inserted into the League 
of Nations Covenant, the question becomes: why did Republicans disapprove of it as 
written? For Republicans, Article XXI of the Covenant was not strong enough and did 
not provide the United States the sole discretion over interpretation of the American 
policy. Even more so, Republicans were not just seeking to protect the Monroe Doctrine, 
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but they also sought to maintain supremacy in the hemisphere through the Roosevelt 
Corollary.    
 In an attempt to claim the United States as an isolationist nation and build support 
for his position against Wilson’s League, Lodge wrote: “the Americas shall be separated 
from Europe and from the interference of Europe in purely American questions.” Lodge 
based this assertion on the Monroe Doctrine, which he stated, “exists solely for the 
protection of the American Hemisphere, and to that hemisphere it was limited.” Along 
with this, Lodge confessed that the United States did not seek “acquisition or conquest of 
territory.” While he appeared to scale back his imperialist rhetoric which he proudly 
professed twenty years earlier, Lodge wanted to ensure the United States retained what it 
already controlled, such as the Panama Canal.
185
 
 One of the strongest pieces of evidence that demonstrates Republican imperialism 
in their refusal to accept the League stems from the Lodge-Lowell Debate. This debate 
was held in Boston at Symphony Hall on March 19, 1919 between Senator Lodge and a 
prominent leader of the League to Enforce Peace, Abbott Lawrence Lowell. During the 
debate, Lodge compared the Monroe Doctrine to a fence, used to keep Europeans out of 
America. If the Senate ratified the Treaty, Lodge concluded, the Doctrine would be null 
and void because questions arising out of the American Hemisphere would be subject to 
discussion within the League of Nations. Lodge’s opponent, however, charged that the 
senator’s “only object is expansion of the United States.”186 Lowell identified Lodge’s 
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ultimate goal as the guarantee that the United States would retain its possessions and its 
authority within the Western Hemisphere.  
 In concurrence with Lowell, Arnold Hall described the traditional American 
foreign policy as: “this indefinite power to wield a strong arm in American affairs that 
some of our statesmen are trying to preserve by the amendment to the League of Nations 
that expressly preserves the Monroe Doctrine.”187 Approximately a year before the 
Senate first defeated the Treaty of Versailles, Lodge wrote a letter to Roosevelt in which 
he characterized Wilson’s League as a “very dangerous thing.” He expressed his belief 
that acceptance and membership of the peace organization would allow it to “control the 
Monroe Doctrine or our actions in our own hemisphere.”188 Unwilling to relinquish any 
control over the Americas, Lodge fought for the Monroe Doctrine reservation.  
 This, however, was not the first time Lodge argued for the Monroe Doctrine’s 
inclusion in a treaty. After Olney’s diplomatic squabble with Britain in the 1890s, a treaty 
between Britain and the United States was presented to the Senate for ratification. 
Because this particular treaty would have brought the United States and its mother 
country closer together regarding issues in the Western Hemisphere, Lodge wished to 
ensure the treaty did not negate the Monroe Doctrine’s authority. When told that no issue 
arising under the Monroe Doctrine would fall under the jurisdiction of this treaty, Lodge 
wanted to make sure by inserting an amendment to that effect.
189
 The parallels between 
Lodge’s argument in the 1890s controversy and the League of Nations debate in 1919 are 
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so strikingly similar that one would be loath to retreat to the political argument that many 
historians have belabored throughout the years regarding the Treaty of Versailles 
rejection by Republicans.    
 The issue of America’s possessions in the Pacific presents an intriguing question 
because the Philippines and Guam are technically in Asia, and not within the confines of 
the Western Hemisphere. Lodge hinted at the prospect of advocating for isolation in order 
to also protect America’s possessions in the Pacific. Referring to the Philippines and 
Guam, Lodge wrote in his book, The Senate and the League of Nations, that the United 
States had “interests of our own in Asia and the Pacific.” Since he described the “real 
essence of the Monroe Doctrine” to be that “American questions shall be settled by 
Americans alone,” it appears he believed the Doctrine had the capability of extending its 
reach outside of the hemisphere. Due to the possession of islands in the Pacific, any 
question that would arise of those possessions would be an American question, even 
though it was outside of the Western Hemisphere.
190
 This most likely led Lodge to claim 
a moral position toward not awarding Japan the Shandong Province in China. As Lodge 
saw it, allowing the Japanese to take the province would equal the “building up of 
Japan.” This, Lodge contended, “will be the coming danger to the world.”191 Lodge was 
afraid that if Japan were allowed to retain control over the Shandong Province, it would 
seek to control other vulnerable areas as well – including the Philippines, an American 
possession.      
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 Unable to speak for all Republicans, Lodge led a majority in the defeat of the 
Treaty of Versailles.
192
 By claiming isolation, Lodge and the rest of the mainstream 
Republicans attempted to hide their true reasons for refusing to ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles without reservations. In all reality, Lodge was not truly isolationist. He cloaked 
his speeches and policies in terms of isolation in order to achieve his main objective, 
which was to continue expansionist policies instituted by President Roosevelt 
approximately twenty years earlier. 
 Lodge’s call for isolation did not result from America’s refusal to commit its 
forces to overseas engagements, but rather this reasoning formed part of a larger policy. 
America was to be its own nation in the world. In order to do this, Republicans needed to 
accept a position of isolation. While it seems that Lodge’s party changed its foreign 
policy during World War One, in truth, party members continued to carry out their 
imperialistic notions advanced during Roosevelt’s presidency. To achieve this objective, 
Republicans needed to appear isolationist in order to remain free from any unwanted 
interference from European states.     
The philosophical difference between the Republican leaders’ and Wilson’s view 
of the role the United States should play in the world resulted in the Senate’s defeat of the 
Treaty. Clearly, neither party commanded a support system strong enough to ratify the 
Treaty since it failed both with and without the Lodge reservations. Not only does this 
demonstrate that divisions erupted within both camps, but that the issue deeply concerned 
Americans from both sides of the aisle. Senators knew that the decision they made would 
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affect America’s destiny. Those who held Wilson’s belief that the United States should 
lead by example lost the fight, as did those who sided with Lodge’s idea that the country 
should continue to be its own leader.  
 While politics played a role in the League’s defeat, the desire to remain an 
imperial power, at least within the Western Hemisphere, propelled Republicans to defend 
an isolationist position and argue for the preservation of the Monroe Doctrine. One 
wonders, though, if the outcome would have been different had the Treaty of Versailles 
included an expressed recognition of America’s right to define the Monroe Doctrine. A 
skillful politician, Lodge used Monroe’s foreign policy as a transparent veil of isolation. 
This position allowed the United States to continue shining light from the Roosevelt 
Corollary over the American Hemisphere.  
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